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HENRY ORDOWER*
This Article argues that the zealous representation model of contemporary legal
practice, with its emphasis only on the client, often results in lawyers assisting
and motivating their clients to exploit the clients power advantages in nonlitigation contexts. The Article recommends that ethical rules shift to a multiple
client representation model, based upon the Brandeisian lawyer for the
situation. The model would empower attorneys in non-litigation settings to
encourage their clients to consider and evaluate the impact on other
constituencies that the representation may affect. Attorneys would become better
able to encourage their clients to seek distributional fairness and balance in their
business and personal legal activities to the possible long-term advantage of
both client and lawyer.

I. INTRODUCTION
Americans probably would agree that the rule of law is critical to a peaceful
society. Reliance on and belief in disinterested judges, administrative specialists
and arbitrators to resolve disputes fairly and peacefully are fundamental to the
modern American system. Government agencies are available to enforce
judgments and awards. Complex pleading rules that America inherited from
England have disappeared; transparent and easily mastered pleading rules have
replaced them. Yet, legal process is not free from complexity or opportunity to
delay and sometimes prevent the rendition of court judgments by use of motions
and discovery.1

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., M.A., The University of

Chicago, A.B., Washington University. The author thanks his student research assistant,
Rebecca Shiflet, and Margaret McDermott, a law librarian, for assistance with research; his
faculty colleagues who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this Article at a faculty
workshop in February 2002; and his spouse, Ilene Ordower, who proofread several drafts of
this Article.
1 See generally Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil
Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561 (1996); Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery:
From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 597 (1998); Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators:
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998).
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Deeply embedded in American legal practice, zealous advocacy defines the
legal culture,2 and remains vital to lawyers understanding of their professional
role.3 Zealous advocacy can take precedence over one s own moral views as law
students learn not to decline to represent individuals with whom the students
disagree or who advance unpopular causes (whether or not the students agree
with the cause).4 Law schools traditionally rely on casebooks for instructional
material, emphasizing litigation and litigation outcomes as a primary method for
learning the rules of law. Winning the case is of paramount importance. In the
first year of law school, when students generally take a legal writing course, they
observe that skill in persuasion and advocacy defines the quality of the lawyer.
Students learn to argue their client s interests whether the students believe their
client to be right or wrong. The Model Rules sanction such an approach to the
client s interests.5 Even negotiation as a topic of law school curricula emphasizes
advocacy. Negotiation targets securing the most beneficial outcome for one s
client rather than seeking a balanced reconciliation of competing interests. The
assumption is that the counter-party to the negotiation also seeks the most
beneficial outcome for the counter-party s client as well and will competently
advocate for that client. With zealous advocates on both sides of the negotiation,
the outcome should achieve a reasonable balance; if not, one of the advocates
failed to represent her client adequately.6
Lawyers and law students most often learn contract-drafting skills outside the
law school setting,7 through summer or part-time employment with a law firm.
As law students begin to prepare contracts, they rely heavily on existing forms
that lawyers in the firm may have developed over lengthy periods and numerous
transactions. The forms tend to depart from non-performance and remedies rather
2 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, also referred to as the Model Code in

the following, imposes the duty of zealous advocacy upon lawyers. Ethical Consideration 7-1
reads: [t]he duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law. MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1
(1986).
3 While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, also referred to as the Model Rules in
the following, soften the emphasis on zeal as the cultural norm of law practice, the Model Rules
nevertheless begin with zealous advocacy and moderate zeal as necessary to respond to nonadversarial contexts. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 8 (2002). The primary sets of
ethical rules this Article examines are those the American Bar Association issued.
4 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002).
5 Id.
6 Power negotiating is the ability to change the attitude or behavior of another to get
your way when dealing with others. DAVID V. LEWIS, POWER NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND
TECHNIQUES 9 (1981).
7 Law schools frequently do integrate some drafting exercises into a variety of courses and
through their legal research and writing programs, but contract drafting rarely consumes as
much of the student s time as brief writing or expository writing (law review notes).
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than assumed performance and satisfactory economic accommodation. Thus, new
lawyers learn that their primary objective is to protect their client from all possible
eventualities when the other party to the contract fails to perform. Professor Karl
Llewellyn observed, [b]usiness lawyers tend to draft to the edge of the
possible. 8 The orientation toward one-sided, all-eventualities drafting becomes
the office practice complement to Rambo depositions and similar discovery
practices in litigation.9 And new lawyers learn from other lawyers to provide the
same zealous representation.
The growth of the law and economics movement has fortified the culture of
zeal by making the comparison of economic costs and benefits the essence of
legal analysis. The Coase Theorem stimulated the law and economics
movement,10 a now dominant feature of modern American legal analysis and
planning.11 Consistent with economic analysis,12 American lawyers strive to
attain maximal benefit for their clients within the bounds of the law. So long as
the client does not violate the law, harm to others from maximizing the client s
8 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM N, 1 HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
177 (1954). The then proposed unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code would have protected consumers from unreasonable and unnecessary contractual
provisions.
9 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), has been read in a
number of differing manners. One formulation of the Coase Theorem might be that identifiable
and stable property rights without regard to moral considerations are critical to a rational
legal and economic system because stable rights facilitate economically efficient bargaining
with respect to the rights. Moral considerations might help parties to predict legal outcomes
where the legal rights are uncertain, but they do not contribute to efficient resource allocations.
Changes in legally protected rights generate displacements. With any change in rights, there
may be both positive and negative impacts. Thus, in formulating or changing legal rules, courts
or legislatures ought to regard total effect, rather than some narrower transactional effect.
Coase, however, does not limit total effect to economic factors alone. See discussion infra Part
VI.
11 Economic analysis is less significant to litigation than it is to transactional planning
because litigation outcomes depend upon the analytical methods that third party arbiters
employ. Even sound economic analysis, as opposed to other non-economic factors, may not
persuade the fact finder or judge. Certain judges do have the reputation for applying economic
analysis in their decision making. Most recognizable among judges who consistently employ
law and economics analysis to their decisions are Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit. See Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing
the Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141 (2002),
for empirical research and analysis of the frequency with which casebooks cite opinions that
economics-oriented judges write.
12 The Coase Theorem assumes equal bargaining power and a well-defined property rule
in order to generate an economically efficient outcome. Power disparity may distort the
efficiency of the result. Moreover, Coase does not limit analysis to readily quantifiable
economic factors. Coase, supra note 10, at 42 44; see also discussion infra Part VI.
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benefit may become a matter of cost-benefit comparison.13 So if the costs of the
client s actions, including compensation for damage that the client may have to
pay for harm caused, are less than the benefit the client derives, the lawyer will
recommend the course of action accordingly.14 Decision making becomes a
function of cost-benefit analysis as lawyers encourage their clients to disregard
non-economic factors.
Some recent legal scholarship suggests that the legal profession attracts
adversarial personalities to its ranks. Susan Daicoff identifies eight characteristics
of those drawn to law that confirm the adversarial personality of lawyers:
materialism, need for achievement, preference for dominance, competitiveness,
tendency to respond to stress by becoming more aggressive and ambitious,
insensitivity to interpersonal, emotional, humanistic concerns, the Myers-Briggs
dimension of Thinking as an approach to decision making, and a rights
orientation to moral decision making (as opposed to an ethic of care).15

Accordingly, lawyers embedded personality traits perpetuate zeal as fundamental
to the lawyering culture. Other studies, like the interviews that Lawrence Joseph
conducted, confirm the existence of a personality range among those that the legal
profession draws.16 Similarly, clients have come to expect zeal from their
lawyers. The popular media, both print and television, generally depict attorneys
in their litigating postures as ardent advocates of their clients causes. This image
of the lawyer regularly enjoys a positive spin as attorneys determinedly pursue
unpopular but just causes and help to free clients who are wrongly accused of
crimes, even when the representation is not remunerative. Newsworthy lawyers
often are those who sit beside their clients at Congressional hearings and protect

13 Lawyers often consider the costs and benefits of violating the law as they evaluate the

risk of possible criminal sanctions to the client in adopting certain courses of action. Participants
in both the tobacco and the automobile manufacturing industries have pursued courses of
conduct that have harmed others, possibly criminally, following careful legal analyses of the
risks. See discussion of the Pinto analysis in George Priest, Economic of Civil Justice Reform
Proposals, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 401, 402 03 (2000).
14 Economic factors are not necessarily predictable or simple to quantify despite
widespread use of this type of economic analysis.
15 Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 594
(1998).
16 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND (1993) (presenting a study of the lawyer s
personality reflected through a series of partially fictionalized interviews that offers a bleak
picture of the lawyer s character); see also Pierre Schlag, The Lawyerland Essays, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1730, 1730 96 (2001) (offering commentaries by Schlag, David A. Skeel, Jr., Robin
West, Sarah Krakoff, David Luban, Robert Weisberg, and Lawrence Joseph).
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their clients by advising them not to answer questions. The public face of the legal
profession emerges from and reinforces the culture of zeal.
But this public view of lawyering takes shape primarily in litigation settings
where zealous advocacy may be both desirable and essential. The lawyer s
personality traits may be psychologically necessary to allow lawyers to represent
unpopular clients or causes and facilitate equal access to justice. 17 In an
adversarial posture in which each adversary has the luxury of competent
representation and adequate resources to pursue litigation, few would doubt that
the lawyer ought to represent the client zealously and seek to assist the client to
accomplish the client s lawful objectives.18 Much lawyering, however, either is
not inherently adversarial,19 or involves circumstances of power disparity that
preclude one of the adversaries from advancing his interests effectively.20
This Article inquires whether the culture of zeal with its accompanying single
client representation model confines lawyering inappropriately and unnecessarily
by prohibiting or restricting lawyers from representing multiple clients, as they
should, in many non-litigation contexts. The Article observes that single client
representation as a generally ideal lawyering model,21 is a myth when applied to
the lawyer s role in modern civil, office practice.22 The single client model often
propels the lawyer to encourage her client to exploit a power advantage in ways
that might not occur to the client, that the client would eschew absent the lawyer s
encouragement and that even might not be in the client s best interests in the long
term.
The Article argues that despite real and potential conflicts of interest, a
multiple client representation model better suits much non-litigation practice than
17 Daicoff, supra note15, at 594.
18 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 8 (2002); see also supra note 3.
19 Attorneys help solve an array of problems that do not place parties at odds to one

another. In fact, lawyers even seek to solve problems that clients and prospective clients do not
know they have. See discussion of the lawyer as entrepreneur infra Part VII.C.
20 See discussion of power disparity infra Part VI.
21 For example, Debra Lyn Bassett, Three s a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint
Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 388 (2001), forcefully argues that existing conflicts of
interest rules are too lax, as they are aimed at facilitating the business of law rather than the
professionalism of lawyers.
22 The American Bar Association s recent revisions to the Model Rules would seem
to acknowledge how common multiple client representation is in contemporary American
law practice. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002) governing conflicts of
interest focuses upon the issue of concurrent conflicts of interest far more than its
predecessor, MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001), did. The newer rule
permits the lawyer to represent multiple clients with concurrent conflicts so long as each
client gives informed consent to the common representation. Commentary to the newer
rule elaborates extensively on the common representation model of practice but does

not encourage adopting the model as this Article does.
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the traditional single client model.23 A multiple client representation model would
permit and, in some instances, require the lawyer to evaluate the impact of her
advice to the client on other constituencies that the prospective conduct affects.
Lawyers would accommodate legal advice to the needs and interests of those
other constituencies.24 The underlying premise of the multiple client model is that
clients, free from contrary influences, including legal advice grounded in
economic analysis and evaluation of legal exposure, generally prefer not to
exploit power in ways that are harmful to others. Clients are willing to forego
some immediate economic advantage in favor of harmony and conflict avoidance
that might serve them better in the future.25 Recent behavioral studies using
economic game playing confirm that fair dealing and sharing take precedence
over profit maximization.26 Moreover, economic game theory suggests that
cooperative sharing frequently enhances profitability for all parties.27
Part II of this Article will provide some background concerning how current
ethical rules encourage zealous advocacy in a single client representation model.
Part III explores traditional multiple party representation as a model for nonlitigation lawyering. Part IV looks at other constituencies that attorneys
representation of clients affects and builds upon the multiple client representation
model to propose a standard for consideration of those constituencies. Part V
briefly reviews current discourse in legal ethics as it addresses separate codes for
specialty areas and the development of the ethics of care. Part VI addresses power
disparities and their exploitation. Part VII introduces concepts of the lawyer s
varying interventional roles. Part VIII presents examples of interventional
functions and interests of other constituencies. Part IX concludes that current
ethical rules limit lawyers responsibility to indirect clients and recommends
23 See infra Part III.
24 See infra Parts VI, VIII.
25 Cf. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY ch. 10 (1994) (proposing a moral discourse with the client as part of the
lawyer s counseling). The authors express the view that the client will adopt a conciliatory
course of action if the lawyer gently offers an analysis based upon fairness. Id. In the authors
example the client wishes to oppose a zoning variance for a home for men but the lawyer
persuades the client to evaluate the operation of the home and its impact on the neighborhood,
thereby leading the client to conclude that the impact on the neighborhood will not be as
unfavorable as the client initially anticipated. Id. at 116 19. The context of the example is
litigation-like, with the lawyer acting with respect to specific instructions and seeking to
persuade the client to abandon his chosen course of action. Id.; cf. infra Parts VII.A, VIII.C
(discussing the scrivener lawyer).
26 See generally Bruce Bower, A Fair Share of the Pie: People Everywhere Put a Social
Spin on Economic Exchanges, 161 SCI. NEWS 104 (2002) (comparing studies of economic
exchanges within various cultures). See further discussion infra Part VI.
27 See generally JOHN F. NASH, JR., ESSAYS ON GAME THEORY (1996); MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS (1990).
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broader indirect client obligations based upon a multiple party representational
model as part of the norm for legal ethics.

II. BACKGROUND ON THE CULTURE OF ZEAL, THE MODEL CODE AND THE
MODEL RULES
Level playing fields enable disinterested arbiters, judges and arbitrators to
make informed and fair decisions. Whenever one party has greater resources than
the other, this paradigm shifts. Differentials in resources may provide tactical
advantages. No longer does the disinterested arbiter necessarily gain access to all
information that might be pertinent to a fair decision. One party may use its
greater resources to limit access to important information,28 overwhelm the
arbiter with information favorable to that party or simply delay the rendition of an
unfavorable decision in order to arbitrage the difference between pre-judgment
interest and investment return.29 Conscientious arbiters, undoubtedly, free
themselves from the influences of resource disparity and reach a fair result in any
event. And thoughtful, creative advocates may enable the resource-disadvantaged
party to overcome the limitations on resources through persuasive advocacy.
Nevertheless, power disparity remains troubling because it increases the risk that
the legal system will generate an unjust result as the zealous advocate for the
resource-advantaged party exploits her client s superior resources to her client s
advantage. Furthermore, non-litigation-based interaction with the legal system
lacks the intermediation of a disinterested arbiter to aid in leveling the playing
field. Unfortunately, standard ethical rules governing law practice do not change
with the power paradigm or the non-litigation context.30
Criticism that the Model Code suited only litigation practice and not the
transactional practice of law in part led the American Bar Association to develop
the Model Rules.31 While the Model Rules may address some ethical issues that
the transactional lawyer faces better than the Model Code did, both the Model
Rules and the Model Code fortify the adversarial, single client advocacy model.
Single client models are simple and easy to police. Divided loyalties and
28 Resisting discovery, for example. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 511 (1994).
29 Id. at 536.
30 The Model Rules assume that personal conscience and the approbation of professional
peers guide the lawyer s behavior with respect to matters that neither law nor the Model Rules
govern. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2002). And the negative inference of
Model Rules preamble eight suggests that zealous representation may be inappropriate when
the opponent is not well represented. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 8.
31 For a brief description of the history of the professional responsibility rules, see Steven
C. Krane, Ethics 2000: What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 323 (1999).
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balancing of interests, the touchstones of multiple client representation, are not
accommodating to bright line rules for codes of professional conduct.32 Yet
multiple client representation is characteristic of much of civil, non-litigation
representation.33
Until the most recent revision of the Model Rules,34 neither the Model Code
nor the Model Rules provided practical guidelines for ethical conduct in the realm
of traditional multiple party representation.35 Neither departs from the adversarial,
single client advocacy model to address constituencies other than readily
identifiable clients.36 Both sets of rules emphasize the primacy of the client in the
lawyer-client relationship. Both tend to trivialize the impact that representation
may have on third parties and do not compel the lawyer to consider broader
ethical questions of other parties in the course of client representation. The Model
Code focuses on the identifiable client, as it requires the lawyer to represent the
client zealously within the bounds of the law. 37 Under the Model Code, the
advocate has no duty to adversaries or other third parties other than the duty to
avoid needless injury to others38 and the more general obligation to the courts that
requires lawyers to disclose adverse authority.39

32 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2002).
33 See discussion infra Part IV.
34 See supra note 22 (discussing recent changes to Model Rule 1.7).
35 Until the most recent revision of the Model Rules that withdrew MODEL RULES OF

PROF L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2001), the Model Rules sought to address some nonrepresentational roles that lawyers assume with that rule. Model Rule 2.2 permitted the
lawyer to serve as an intermediary but required withdrawal when the going got rough. For an
extensive discussion of the concept of intermediation under the withdrawn Model Rule 2.2, see
John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the
Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741 (1992). The Model Rules now view
intermediation primarily as a non-representational role that the Model Rules no longer
expressly regulate. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (2002).
36 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶¶ 1 9 (2002) address broader roles for
the lawyer but do not transform many of those roles into rules of conduct. MODEL RULES
OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002), a conflict of interests regulation, acknowledges the
prevalence of multiple party representation and both facilitates and discourages such
representation. But see Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 765 67 (observing that Model Rule 2.2
as in effect, before withdrawal, was applicable and permitted a broad variety of multiple client
representation).
37 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986); MODEL CODE OF PROF L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1986).
38 Model Code EC 7-10 offers that zealous advocacy does not preclude treating others
with consideration in order to avoid inflicting needless harm. Implicit is the assumption that
the lawyer will inflict harm on others when necessary to zealous client representation. MODEL
CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1986).
39 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1986).
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In fact, an obligation not to lie is absent from the Model Code and the Model
Rules.40 The Model Code controls misrepresentation to opponents through
conflict rules that prohibit communication to a represented party41 and prohibit
advising a party whose interests may be adverse to those of one s client.42 The
Model Rules go somewhat further and prohibit the making of a false statement
of material fact or law to a third person and the failure to disclose material facts
if necessary to prevent the lawyer from assisting a criminal or fraudulent act.43
Not only did the American Bar Association fail to compel lawyers to be
truthful but also missed its opportunity to limit attorneys assistance to clients
who overreach less powerful contracting parties by including unenforceable and
unconscionable provisions in contracts. The ABA failed to intervene at contract
drafting level as it rejected a proposed rule that would have prohibited attorneys
from including illegal provisions in contracts.44

40 Discussion drafts of the Model Rules, if adopted, would have required significantly

more truthfulness in negotiation than the rule the ABA adopted. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 4 4.3 (Discussion Draft 1980). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Lawyer s Obligation to be Trustworthy when Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S. CAL. L.
REV. 181 (1981) (examining whether lawyers should have an obligation to be truthful and
concludes that each practice level (lawyering subculture) has its own conventions and that
general rules on truthfulness other than fraud proscription are impractical); Gary Tobias
Lowenthal, The Bar s Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 411 (1988) (contending that lawyers always should be truthful and the ABA missed its
opportunity to require truthfulness).
41 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1986).
42 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1986).
43 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002). The affirmative disclosure
obligation with regard to material facts is prospective only so that the lawyer will not further a
criminal or fraudulent act. Completed client acts require no disclosure. Model Rule 1.6
governing confidential communications precludes disclosure of most prospective matters if
disclosure would violate a client s confidence. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2002). Recently, however, the Internal Revenue Service has argued successfully that the
tax practitioner-client privilege under I.R.C. 7525 (2003) does not protect the generalized
advice that an tax practitioner (or attorney) provides in creating a tax shelter product for a
promoter even if the practitioner has contact with the promoters clients. See United
States v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 337 F.3d 802, 813 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying investors
right to intervene to prevent enforcement of a summons for customer lists).
44 The ABA rejected the draft of Model Rule 4.3 that would have included that
prohibition. The proposed rule read: [a] lawyer shall not conclude an agreement, or assist a
client in concluding an agreement, that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal,
contains legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be unconscionable
as a matter of law. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (Discussion Draft 1980). For
thoughtful analysis and criticism of that rejected provision, see William T. Vukowich, Lawyers
and The Standard Form Contract System: A Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6 GEO. J.
LEG. ETHICS 799, 833 (1993).
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At the same time, confidentiality rules expressly disfavor multiple party
representation that would serve as a model for the balancing of varying
interests.45 Multiple party representation creates an unavoidable conflict because
effective representation of one party may require the attorney to use and reveal
confidential information received from another represented party. While all
parties may consent to the multiple representation and concomitant disclosures in
support of the representation, the Model Rules make the representation awkward.
Consent to disclosure before the necessary degree of disclosure becomes known
renders it difficult to ascertain whether the attorney will be able to comply with
the requirement that the representation not be materially limited by the lawyer s
responsibilities to another client. 46
Further, neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code offers strong protection
to the public from lawyers misconduct. Neither provides remedies to clients,
much less non-clients, whom the lawyer s conduct affects.47 If the relevant state
bar has adopted either the Code or the Rules, violations of specific ethical rules
may result in the bar or the state s high court taking disciplinary action against the
lawyer. Historically, no private right of action inured to the parties the lawyer s
misconduct affected under the Code or the Rules.48
In fact, compliance with the Code or the Rules as the relevant jurisdiction
adopts them may shield the attorney who follows the rules from liability for
misconduct.49 Professional malpractice arises when the professional fails to meet

Courts occasionally have been better than the legal profession s self-regulatory
associations in limiting the exploitation of power advantages as they refuse to enforce
particularly distasteful contractual rights. See, e.g., Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co. of Iowa, 855
F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1988) (concerning a lender not telling borrower that she could have
repaid the same loan with lower monthly payments in one-half the time deprived her of fair
notice and amounted to unfair surprise); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 379 80, 383 84
(Alaska 1986) (holding it was unconscionable for real estate agent to purchase 73 year-old
woman s property on 30-year term with payments that did not even cover the accruing interest;
court reformed contract to reflect reasonable payments); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298
N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding purchase price of $1235 for freezer unit worth
approximately $300 unconscionable and reduced by court).
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002).
47 The Model Rules mention disciplinary proceedings, but look to substantive law for
other regulation of lawyers behavior. The Model Rules do not offer a private right of action.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT scope ¶¶ 14 15 (2002).
48 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6.31 (5th ed. 2000);
see Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting reference to the
ethical rules during trial as not relevant to the legal standard of care); see also Note, The
Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1105 06 (1996).
49 Cf. Lowenthal, supra note 40, at 445 47.
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industry standards in the practice of a profession.50 The Code and the Rules
provide a valuable definition of industry standards with respect to general,
operational matters, as opposed to level of skill and competence, in representation
of clients.51 So compliance with the Code or Rules means that the attorney has
met certain industry standards while failure to comply is not prima facie evidence
of malpractice (although failure to comply may be evidentiary of malpractice).52

III. MODELING MULTIPLE PARTY REPRESENTATION53
Despite ethics rules that disfavor multiple party representation,54 such
representation remains common and generally successful.55 With the possible
exception of divorce,56 multiple party representation is successful in the sense that
few complaints to state bar associations57 and few legal malpractice claims arise
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 299A (1965) for an explanation of

professional negligence.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga.
1995) (holding that professional ethical standards are evidence of the common law duty of
care); see also Note, supra note 48, at 1108.
53 Compare the discussion of Justice Louis D. Brandeis s concept of the lawyer for the
situation in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 634 37
(3d ed. 1999) or the more extensive discussion in Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 748 57.
Brandeis concept embraced a far greater interventional model than simply drafting documents
for a deal. His lawyering for the situation included a considerable mediation or arbitration
function.
54 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 783 84 (rejecting firmly the Brandeisian notion of
representing the situation rather than the parties, so that intermediation is multiple client
representation and not situational representation).
56 Id. at 759. While divorce is regularly a matter of mutual assent, animosities are difficult
to overcome and emotions may run high rendering it extremely difficult for a single lawyer to
intermediate between the divorcing parties.
57 For example, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
assembled some statistics for 2000 that disclose that 21% of complaints filed with the Hearing
Boar involve conflicts of interest. ILL. ATTORNEY AND DISCIPLINARY COMM N, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION chart 8 (2000),
available at http://www.iardc.org/main_annreport.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). More than
half of those filings involved concurrent conflicts in violation of Model Rule 1.7 but the
statistics do not show how many of those complaints were non-consensual concurrent
representation. Id. One-third of the concurrent conflict cases resulted in disciplinary action. Id.
at chart 15. Moreover, a far smaller percentage of docketed charges (probably under 5%)
involved violation of Rule 1.7. Id. at chart 2. Similarly, John E. Howe, Report of the Office of
Chief Disciplinary Counsel, 56 J. MO. B. 277, 280 81 (2000), shows 4 cases of transactional
conflicts in Missouri of 925 complaints filed.
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from a lawyer representing multiple parties in business transactions or general
representation involving multiple family members.58 Multiple party
representation generally compels the lawyer to balance competing interests of the
clients the representation concerns. Limited anecdotal evidence suggests that
lawyers whose practices regularly place them in multiple party representational
settings develop a facility for balancing interests and making clients comfortable
with the lawyer s role.59
While the task of balancing multiple, sometimes disparate interests seems
daunting, many practitioners do just that with considerable success. Mindful of
the barriers that the ethical rules present to such representation, many of those
practitioners would deny that they represent multiple clients in a single transaction
or context where disharmonies among the clients are present. Candor with respect
to multiple party representation threatened and certainly delayed the Senate
Confirmation of Justice Brandeis appointment to the United States Supreme
Court.60 Yet, multiple client representation is common61 and provides a useful
model for protecting the interests of other constituencies that the representation
affects.
The paradigm for multiple client representation involves several parties
acting together who agree to engage the lawyer to prepare documentation for a
business venture in which they all will participate. The parties negotiate the
economic, managerial and control terms of their deal and the lawyer will describe
the deal s structure and the parties interests in the venture in appropriate

58 The American Bar Association has collected limited amounts of statistical information

in ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS PROF L LIAB., LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN THE
1990S (1996) and ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS PROF L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 1996 1999 (2001) [hereinafter ABA PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS 1996 1999]. Table 5 to the 1996 1999 study discloses that only 5% of claims involve
a conflict of interest. Id. at 12. In commenting on the increase in conflicts of interest claims
from the 1990s study, the 1996 1999 study observes: [t]hese claims are brought upon by the
volatile nature of the business community with executives and key employee [sic] moving from
company to company and their lawyers also changing firms at a greater rate than ever before.
Id. Thus, the committee does not see multiple party representation as the source of conflicts
claims. While some nearly 9% of malpractice claims involve estates, trusts and probate, many
of those involve complaints that the attorney had inadequate knowledge of the law or that the
attorney did not consider or represent interests of non-client family members. Id. at 5; see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 981
83 (1996).
59 The anecdotal evidence stems from discussions with sole and small firm practitioners
and personal observation in practice settings.
60 John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 697 99
(1965). Being Jewish, however, may have been a more significant factor causing the Senate to
scrutinize Brandeis record with greater care than it might have had he not been a Jew.
61 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 761.
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documents.62 The lawyer is to be a scrivener,63 preparing the document according
to instructions, making it legally understandable and enforceable by all. To the
extent the lawyer has any advisory role, it is to identify structural flaws in the
negotiated terms that might interfere with the smooth operation of the transaction.
The lawyer s role is not to advise each party with respect to matters specific to
that party, but all understand that the lawyer may suggest modifications that are
helpful to one party and not adverse to the others.
When the lawyer accepts the engagement, she is mindful of the rules of legal
ethics. She cautions the parties that she represents none of them individually and
intends to remain neutral. The lawyer tells the clients that she will continue to act
only so long as the parties define the terms of the deal and reconcile any
differences they may have with one another without her intervention. She will
withdraw from common representation and will not represent any party if the
parties come into conflict with one another.64 Thus, the lawyer avoids the conflict
of interest prohibitions on representing multiple parties.
One finds, however, that the strictness of the representation limits is far more
fluid than the description in the preceding paragraph would suggest. Frequently,
the lawyer becomes a mediator among the parties without her role becoming
defined as mediator. Sometimes, perhaps regularly, the lawyer continues to act for
one party while the others either act for themselves or secure separate
representation.65 Frequently, the lawyer, possibly inadvertently, represents one
party over the others because she has existing information about that party that
causes her to see that party s position and legal needs more clearly than those of
other parties. While all this fluidity may conflict with or violate the ethical rules
set forth in the Model Rules, the nature of law practice, human nature, and the
specific representational context make the fluidity inevitable.
62 Model Rule 1.7 permits the lawyer to represent multiple parties under limited

circumstances, or, more generally, with their informed consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
63 As defined infra in Part VII.A, a scrivener prepares legal documents according to a
client s instruction without rendering legal advice (other than as to the form of the
documentation). It is unlikely that a lawyer could argue successfully in a disciplinary or
malpractice context that she rendered no legal advice at all. Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at
780 81, sees acting as scrivener as a form of intermediation under withdrawn Model Rule 2.2
so that all parties are clients to whom the lawyer renders advice.
64 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a), 1.9 (2002).
65 Generally, the lawyer either will withdraw if the transactional disagreements between or
among the parties lead to litigation, or the lawyer will secure a waiver of the conflict from the
parties she will not continue to represent so that she may continue to represent one party. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a), (b) (2002). Many lawyers are reluctant to
become the lawyer for the deal unless all parties recognize that the lawyer will continue to
represent one party, rather than withdrawing, if disagreements arise. The lawyer must protect
her source of revenue.
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Clients opt for a single lawyer to prepare the documentation for the deal in
order to avoid the economic inefficiency of multiple lawyers. One party generally
suggests engaging the services of an attorney with whom that party already has a
relationship.66 The lawyer may be representing the client simultaneously on one
or more other matters.67 Perhaps the attorney is much in demand and the client
assumes that he will gain increased access to the lawyer as the client brings the
lawyer more business. Perhaps the client assumes that by using a lawyer with
whom the client has a relationship, the lawyer, while remaining substantially
neutral, will look out for the client s interests (and the client may be correct in that
assumption). Other parties to the transaction may prefer their own attorneys but
yield to the party who leads the deal or invests the greatest amount of capital into
the deal. Thus, selection of the lawyer for the situation may be a function of
power disparity among the parties to the transaction, as the client exploits his
power advantage to insist upon the lawyer he thinks will be best for him.
From the attorney s perspective, refusing common representation is
impractical. As much as she may wish the protection that separate representation
may afford her, it is likely that she either will accept common representation or
will end up with no part in the representation. In the absence of existing conflicts
among the clients, she is unlikely to be able to convince them that each needs
separate counsel. Failure to accept the engagement may lead her historical client
to look elsewhere for general representation. The lawyer who becomes the lawyer
for the deal has an opportunity to capture the general representation of each party.
Thus, if the attorney declines the engagement, she may lose a client, but if she
accepts the engagement, her business may gain new clients. So the lawyer
resolves her dilemma by accepting the engagement hoping that the deal will
work out and the parties will not become adversaries.
As to the lawyer s neutrality, it may be more aspiration than practicality.68
The parties should define the terms of their own deal. If the terms upon which the
parties agree affect the lawyer s historical client adversely, and the client is
unaware of the adverse impact, the lawyer will inform the historical client. A
66 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 803 (seeing the lawyer s prior representation of one of
the parties as a serious impediment to the lawyer s representation of multiple parties including
that prior client because of loyalty and confidentiality concerns).
67 Law firms with multiple lawyers may have the luxury to allocate different lawyers to
different tasks so that the lawyer acting for the situation may not be involved with other matters
involving the client who refers the business. Whether or not such firms successfully isolate the
lawyer for the situation from other matters for the same client through Chinese walls is
questionable. See discussion infra note 72 and accompanying text.
68 Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8 characterize neutrality as a matter of loyalty and the ability
to exercise independent judgment of behalf of a client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, & cmts. (2002). The informed consent of all clients permits the
lawyer to proceed with the representation. Comments to the cited Model Rules are
cautionary and alert a lawyer to conflicts of loyalty. Id.
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lawyer simply does not remain silent about such matters and allow her client to
proceed with a disadvantageous transactional structure. The better the lawyer
knows the client, and the more important the client is to the lawyer s revenue
stream, the more likely it is that the lawyer will be sensitive to the general
business, economic, and tax needs of that client. The attorney may be willing to
provide similar service to the other parties to the transaction but, without the
historical relationship, she may not be aware of matters that affect the other
parties adversely.
If conflicts among the parties arise, the lawyer for the deal will not withdraw
immediately. Fundamental to any successful business practice is focus on
completing the transaction. Business lawyers explore variant structures, seek to
find common ground, and bring the transaction to fruition. Withdrawal from
representation as soon as conflicts arise is inconsistent with successful
lawyering.69 Only when one or more of the other parties engages separate counsel
will the common representation cease. Even then, the lawyer is likely to continue
her involvement in the transaction in an unclearly defined capacity, but in which
her primary focus is, possibly inadvertently, on the interests of her historical
client.70
Continuing involvement by the attorney who represented multiple clients
after some of the original clients engage separate counsel is also routine in
business settings. Efficiencies lead business clients who anticipate that they will
obtain separate representation before they complete the transaction to begin the
process with a single lawyer. The lawyer will prepare the first drafts of the
transaction agreement and the parties will negotiate as many of the basic terms as
they can with the one lawyer involved. Then each party will engage separate
counsel (except the one who brought the initial lawyer to the table) to review the
contract on his behalf and recommend modifications for the specific party. All
parties anticipate from the outset that the initial lawyer will continue to represent

69 See Bassett, supra note 21, at 435 (characterizing the risk of conflicts and
disqualification as an unavoidable and costly risk of joint representation).
70 While there appears to be neither statistics nor other empirical study of withdrawal in
the course of multiple client representation, anecdotal evidence suggests that lawyers, perhaps
primarily for economic reasons, tend not to withdraw in many instances in which Model Rule
1.7 and its commentary would require withdrawal. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R.
1.7 & cmt. (2002). Bar associations neither solicit nor collect information on attorney
withdrawal in office practice, but the ABA PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 1996
1999, supra note 58, at 12, discloses that about 3% of claims involve improper withdrawal from
representation (probably not failure to withdraw following common representation) while some
5% involve conflicts of interest. Some portion of the conflicts claims may involve failure to
withdraw under circumstances that Model Rule 1.7 requires. MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 & cmt. (2002).
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the party who introduced her to the group so no one objects to the continuing
involvement of the original lawyer.71
Chinese wall techniques,72 that large law firms use to isolate the attorney
handling the multiple client matter from other firm representation of one of the
parties, do little to ameliorate conflict of interest concerns. It is likely, and
certainly understandable, that the attorney who has primary responsibility for the
specific client will provide the attorney managing the matter with sufficient
background information on the client to prevent the managing attorney from
drafting documents adverse to that client s interests. While the Chinese wall
concept may comfort other participants in the deal, the Model rules do not
sanction it as a means to avoid conflicts of interest.73
A single lawyer (or firm) acting for all parties to a transaction is a common
occurrence. Small business representation often places the company s lawyer in
the position of looking out for the interests of the various participants.74 The
practice of multiple party representation, with or without a primary client, is
customary in family business representation,75 estate planning for family
groups,76 and even more adversarial situations such as divorce settlements.77 In
all these cases, the Model Rules accommodate the representation but impose strict
constraints that rely on the clients informed, written consent to initiate
representation and the lawyer s withdrawal from representation if certain serious
71 See the description of Brandeis representation of the tannery bankruptcy in HAZARD,
JR., ET AL., supra note 53, at 635.
72 Participants in the investment banking sector frequently apply the term Chinese wall
to describe internal control systems that separate their underwriting from their brokerage
functions to preclude transfer of information on pending offerings that might involve the
brokerage function in insider trading. Accounting firms use the term to refer to separation of
their audit from other client services functions to protect the independence of the audit function.
The term refers, of course, to the Great Wall of China that Chinese emperors had their subjects
build to keep out the barbarians. As Franz Kafka ironically noted in his story, Beim Bau der
Chinesischen Mauer (The Chinese Wall), it was impossible to undertake a vast project like the
wall without leaving gaps. FRANZ KAFKA, SÄMTLICHE ERZÄHLUNGEN 289 (1969) (translated in
FRANZ KAFKA, THE COMPLETE STORIES 235 (1971)). While the project united the populace, it
provided inadequate protection to the kingdom from the peoples of the north. Id.
73 Model Rule 1.10 treats all firm members alike with respect to disqualification in
conflict situations. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2002). But note that Model
Rule 1.9(c) focuses on use of former client information. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (2002). The Chinese wall might provide the lawyer not involved in the
specific representation with the argument that he had no knowledge of the client matter and the
information that the firm may have is not imputed to him.
74 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 757 60.
75 Id.
76 See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics in Estate Planning and Fiduciary Administration: The
Inadequacy of the Model Rules and the Model Code, 45 REC. ASS N B. CITY N.Y. 715 (1990).
77 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 757 60.
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conflicts of interest arise in the course of representation.78 Yet, probably relatively
few lawyers comply with the strict guidelines. They know their clients and their
clients know and trust them. Often the clients prefer the lawyer in the conflict
situation to a new attorney who neither knows the relationships among the parties,
nor is sensitive to the group s common issues. In those instances, in which the
lawyer has represented one party but not the others, the other parties regularly
find that the representation, albeit unavoidably, is somewhat slanted in favor of
the historical client, is nevertheless satisfactory for their needs too.
As peculiar as the observation may be that non-neutral, multiple client
representation is acceptable, it makes sense if one is able to step back from the
customary dichotomy of neutrality/advocacy. Where parties are working together
toward completion of a defined transaction objective, they need neither a neutral
arbiter to make decisions for them, nor a zealous advocate to represent them. The
lawyer facilitates but does not define their relationship. Unlike litigation
representation, in which the lawyer assumes a primary operational role, the
lawyer in the transactional context is incidental to the parties and the transaction.
Moreover, a lawyer representing multiple parties cannot be a zealot. Multiple
party representation forces the attorney to accommodate known interests of all
parties, rather than advocating for a single party, lest she destroy what otherwise
might become a successful business venture. While the lawyer may be familiar
with the interests of one party, and able to address those interests in the course of
the representation, she generally listens carefully to each party and seeks to learn
what the other parties needs are as well.
In fact, the other parties may be better off with the multiple party
representation model than separate representation. Separate representation does
not prevent the party with the superior bargaining power from dictating the terms
of the deal. In that context, the lawyer for the party with superior bargaining
power may have no compunction about the deal terms because the other parties
have their own representation and understand the terms. On the other hand,
multiple party representation may soften demands for harsh or one-sided terms.
When the historical client wishes to treat the other parties unfairly, the lawyer is
ideally situated to prevent overreaching. The client understands the conflict and
the limitations that the rules of conduct impose upon the lawyer. The lawyer is
well situated to be a voice of reason that coaxes and cajoles the client to do right
so that the lawyer does not have to disclose the issue79 to the other clients and
possibly withdraw from representation.

78 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
79 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002)

(explaining that disclosure
would be fundamental to multiple party representation and implicit in the
engagement).
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The lawyer for the transaction may be the very model for the ethics of care
that a number of commentators recommend to the legal profession.80 She
balances the competing interests of multiple clients in order to complete her task.
She operates marginally outside the constraints of current ethical rules. The
clients accept the limitations of the attorney s role in order to accomplish their
common goals efficiently and with as little animosity as possible.

IV. CLIENTS AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules emphasize that the lawyer be
loyal to the client.81 The Model Rules require the lawyer to pursue the client s
objectives diligently,82 competently83 and without conflicts of interest.84 The
Model Code requires that the lawyer not [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to
him. 85 Further the lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds
of the law, 86 pursue the client s lawful objectives,87 and avoid conflicts of
interest.88 The Model Rules specifically assign to the client the privilege to
determine the objectives of representation within provisions noted in the rule.89
But while the lawyer s obligation of loyalty is clear, the identity of the client may
be uncertain.
In litigation practice, the client s identity and, accordingly, the object of the
lawyer s loyalty, is usually unambiguous.90 Most of the time, the term client
embraces the individual who engages the lawyer and agrees to pay the lawyer s
fee. In non-litigation practice, where the lawyer represents affluent clients who
deal exclusively with others that can afford and are willing to pay for legal
services, identity of the client is similarly transparent. Less transparent is the
identity of the client when the lawyer represents multiple parties in a transactional
or family context. The lawyer owes duties to several individuals and must balance

80 See discussion infra Part V.B.
81 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PROF L

CONDUCT R. 1.7 & cmt. 1 (2002).
82 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002).
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
84 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
85 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (1986).
86 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986).
87 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1986).
88 MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, 5-2 (1986).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
90 Representation of organizations might create some ambiguity even in litigation
contexts. See discussion infra in text accompanying notes 181 89.
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their interests because all have engaged her and contribute to payment of her
fee.91
Sometimes, however, even in cases where all parties can afford
representation, the client is not the individual who engages the lawyer or agrees to
pay the fee. An individual or an entity may engage the lawyer to represent a third
party. Examples include one spouse engaging a lawyer to prepare a will for the
other spouse (or wills for both spouses),92 a parent engaging a lawyer to represent
her child in the purchase of a house, a sole shareholder engaging a lawyer to
represent the corporation, an entity engaging a lawyer to represent a member of
management, etc. In such cases, one may identify the client in terms of the
lawyer s duties, rather than a person who engages her and pays her fee. However,
despite the culture of zeal and its focus on the client, lawyers seem to owe some
duties to other constituencies even under current rules of conduct.
Although the Model Code and the Model Rules assume that the lawyer
interacts both with clients and non-clients, they express no specific duties to nonclients. At the same time, lawyers have rather amorphous general obligations to
the world at large: [a] lawyer . . . is a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice. 93 The drafters of the Model Rules recognized that a lawyer s obligations
to non-clients might be a function of the degree and quality of representation that
the non-client receives:
A lawyer s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing
party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client
and at the same time assume that justice is being done.94

The statement is incomplete. It does not provide specific guidance for those
instances in which the opposing party is not well represented, not represented at
all, or even is unknown.
Non-litigation practice is replete with instances of a lawyer s actions affecting
people who are not the lawyer s direct client and who are unrepresented,
underrepresented, and often unknown.95 Lawyers draft documents and structure
transactions that have direct impact on the well being of many people who are
non-clients in most traditional views of the client/non-client split. This Article
91 See supra Part III.
92 See Pennell, supra note 76, at 719 23 (discussing the ethical issues arising in such

estate planning contexts).
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2002).
94 Id. at pmbl. ¶ 7.
95 See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169,
191 94 (1997).
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argues that impact and power to offset or avoid adverse impact, rather than
narrow definitions of client, should determine whether or not the lawyer owes a
duty to the affected person. Instead of dividing the lawyer s world into clients and
non-clients, the correct division should be into three categories: direct clients,
other constituencies to which the lawyer owes duties,96 and other constituencies
to which the lawyer owes no duties.
Clients are those who engage the lawyer or who define the subject of the
legal representation. Constituencies to which the lawyer owes no duty are (1)
those that the legal representation does not affect and (2) those that enjoy
significant bargaining power and separate representation.97 All other
constituencies are those that the lawyer may anticipate that the legal
representation will affect and that cannot protect themselves from the adverse
impacts of decisions made in the course of the representation.98 Lawyers should
owe a duty to consider the impact of their representation on those other,
inadequately protected constituencies. Lawyers should strive to do no harm 99 to
them. Courts have applied this notion in defining the fiduciary duties of directors
to corporations100 and majority shareholders to minority shareholders.101 Such a
96 These would be indirect or quasi-clients of some sort.
97 In the absence of bargaining power, separate representation is illusory.
98 Commentators have discussed the issue of third party beneficiaries of legal

representation extensively in the estate planning area. See, e.g., Hazard, Jr., supra note 58, at
986 88 (arguing that privity should not bar estate beneficiaries from asserting claims against the
estate planning lawyer); Bradley E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client Privity, Malpractice, and the
Lack of Respect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68
TENN. L. REV. 261, 326 (2001) (arguing for protecting the attorney-client relationship by
barring such claims in all but exceptional cases); Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners:
An Essay on Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 313, 340 (1996) (arguing that in estate planning contexts wives often appear to be
direct clients but their representation becomes subservient to the husband s representation,
leaving her little more representation than unrepresented third parties).
99 This is a customary and loose paraphrase of the Hippocratic Oath. The paraphrase
corresponds to: I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a
suggestion to this effect. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION,
AND INTERPRETATION 3 (Henry E. Sigerist ed., 1943). THE WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
DECLARATION OF GENEVA (1948), PHYSICIAN'S OATH (adopted by the General Assembly of the
World Medical Association, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1948 and amended by the 22nd
World Medical Assembly, Sydney, Australia, August 1968) reads in part, [E]ven under threat,
I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity. The physician s oath
paraphrase may be a good point of reference for lawyers as well as doctors.
100 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
101 See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) (involving a majority of
shareholders creating a holding company to facilitate trading in the underlying operating
company, but failing to invite the minority to exchange shares of the operating company for
shares of the holding company); Singer v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977)
(involving a freeze out merger).
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duty would require lawyers to balance dissonant, often competing interests, in
order to generate fairly distributed102 results in which clients do not overreach
others whom the representation will affect.
A model of multiple client representation would acknowledge and give form
to an attorney s broader obligations to more than her direct and immediate client
under the ethical standards. The new rule would permit wide latitude in multiple
client representation and extend that model to protect the interests of other
affected constituencies. The standard will have to develop over time and integrate
the thoughts of many experts. An initial draft of the standard might be:
Rule. Multiple Client Representation Other Constituencies. Lawyers may
represent multiple clients whenever the relationship of the clients suggests that it
would be less efficient economically, personally, or both economically and
personally for each client to employ separate counsel. For example, multiple
party representation may be appropriate when the clients (i) have a common
business objective with respect to the representation and a willingness to work
out differences between or among them or (ii) are members of a family or other
group having a unifying non-familial relationship. Similarly, multiple party
representation is appropriate when one party is so dominant, economically or
personally, that the other parties lack effective bargaining power such that their
power would not increase materially as a function of separate representation. A
lawyer representing multiple clients shall seek to balance the interests of all
parties in achieving the objectives of the representation.
Sub-rule 1. General Engagements Uninstructed Lawyering.103 A lawyer who
makes recommendations to clients on courses of legal action without specific
and detailed instructions from the client should not encourage a client to exploit
the client s power to the detriment of others. Rather, the lawyer should treat the
client representation as multiple party representation, and ensure that other
constituencies that the representation will impact are also treated as if they were
clients under the general language of the Rule. Accordingly, the lawyer shall
evaluate the impact that a specific legal course of conduct will have on other
constituencies, balance the interests of the client and other affected
constituencies, and recommend legal courses of action that reasonably serve the
client without harming others materially.
Sub-rule 2. Instructed Lawyering. When a client engages the lawyer to follow a
legal course of action that, following careful evaluation of the impact the action
has upon other constituencies, the lawyer concludes will harm others materially,
the lawyer should strive to persuade the client to modify or abandon the course
of legal action to limit or obviate the harm to others. When the client will not
abandon or modify a plan in order to diminish harm to other constituencies, the
lawyer may decline to assist the client to accomplish the client s objectives
whether or not those objectives may be lawful.
102 See infra Part VI (discussing fairness).
103 See infra Part VII.B C (discussing entrepreneur and architect lawyers).
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Sub-rule 3. Nature of Evaluation under Sub-rules 1 and 2. In applying sub-rules
1 and 2 and the general language of the rule, the lawyer should not limit
evaluation to economic analysis of quantifiable costs and benefits. Accordingly,
proposals for legal courses of action and modifications to actions that lawyers
recommend may limit appropriately the client s (and the lawyer s) economic
gain even though the limitation does not increase the economic benefit (or
diminish an economic detriment) to others commensurately. Thus, evaluation
should include factors that are difficult to quantify, such as, self-esteem of
affected parties and the reputation and status in the community of all affected
parties, including the client and the lawyer.
Sub-rule 4. Non-application where no Power Disparity. When other affected
constituencies have adequate representation and sufficient bargaining power to
prevent harm to them, the lawyer may represent the client zealously without
balancing interests. Thus, this rule generally will not apply to most litigation but
may apply to pre-litigation preparation and settlement negotiation.
Sub-rule 5. Confidential Information. If, in order to accomplish the goals this rule
sets forth, the lawyer must become privy to confidences of one or more persons
who are not clients, the lawyer may assure each such person of protection of the
confidence.

The proposed formulation of the rule is amorphous,104 but current standards
of conduct are no less so. Within the conflict of interest limitations,105 the Model
Rules anticipate that attorneys will represent multiple clients but provide only a
broad outline for fulfilling that role.106 In addition, the Model Rules contemplate
broader non-representational roles, including intermediation,107 to compel the
attorney to monitor the relationship for conflicts so that the lawyer will withdraw
at the appropriate moment if withdrawal becomes necessary.108 More generally,
current standards offer a limited array of specific rules and leave the difficult
decisions,109 when the attorney-client relationship is ambiguous, for the lawyer to

104 See Vukowich, supra note 44, at 853 56 (proposing a standard requiring lawyers to
consider counter-party interests in standard forms). Vukowich proposes the standard despite the
uncertainties such a standard would entail for the lawyer. Id.; see also discussion infra Part
VII.C.
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
106 Id.
107 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (2002).
108 See id.; see Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 799 801 (discussing these issues in the
context of now withdrawn Model Rule 2.2).
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2002).
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resolve.110 The Model Rules observe that they provide only a framework for the
ethical practice of law. 111

V. ETHICS DISCOURSE TRENDS
Focus on other constituencies permeates the extensive discourse concerning
the scope of legal ethics that continues even after the ABA s 1980 adoption of the
Model Rules. At least one commentator expressed regret that, by eliminating the
three-tier structure of canon, ethical consideration, and disciplinary rule that
characterized the Model Code, the Model Rules lost the aspirational anchor to the
rules of conduct.112 Other commentators emphasize the inadequacy of ethical
codes or rules for specific practice areas.113 Much of the discussion concerning
specialized codes involves either ambiguities in identifying the client or the
relationship between the lawyer and others whose interests the lawyer reasonably
may anticipate her representation will affect.114 Attention to the effects on, and
needs of, individuals who are not the lawyer s primary, direct clients is an issue
that both proponents of separate ethics rules for specific practice areas and
proponents of the ethics of care emphasize.115 This article suggests that traditional
multiple party representation offers an ethical model satisfactory to the
specialized codes line and the ethics of care line of the legal ethics debate.

A. Proliferating Codes of Ethics
An important trend in the legal ethics discourse relates to the inadequacy of a
single set of rules to govern all practice areas. Commentators observe that the
complexities of disparate areas of practice do not lend themselves to resolution
with either the Model Code or the Model Rules. Professor Lorne, for example,
emphasized the inadequacy of the Model Code in the context of a securities law
practice where the attorney prepares public disclosure documents for the client.116

110 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (requiring lawyers
representing organizations to reconcile the demands of management with the interests of the
entity itself and the shareholders); see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 181 95.
111 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 16 (2002).
112 See, e.g., Krane, supra note 31, at 327 28.
113 See infra notes 118 26 and accompanying text.
114 See infra Part V.A.
115 See infra Part V.B.
116 See generally Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public
Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1978). Section 5 of the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended, prohibits an issuer of securities from offering its securities to the public
without disclosing in a prospectus all information that would be material to a prospective
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In the National Student Marketing investigation,117 the Securities and Exchange
Commission claimed that counsel owed a duty to the public investors to assure
that disclosure documents were complete and accurate. Lorne argues that
ambiguity as to the identification of the client in that context is troubling and
precludes efficient application of the ethical rules.118 Attorneys would be unable
to meet the demand that they advocate for the client because the client consists of
many diverse interests. Under the SEC s argument, the client may include the
purchasers of securities, the board of directors, management, and others whom
the lawyer s activities affected. In many cases, the various clients interests differ
from one another. The common view of the client as the corporation itself is
unsatisfactory because the corporation s board of directors always would need
separate counsel.119 Lorne sees a need for a separate Code of Professional
Advisorial Responsibility.120 Some years after Lorne s article, Stanley Sporkin
argued that the Model Rules did not solve Lorne s problem with the Code.121
Sporkin averred that a separate code is needed for corporate and securities
practice because of the lawyer s obligations to a mix of interested parties,
including shareholders and the public.122
According to Professor Pennell, both the Model Code and the Model Rules
are similarly inadequate to an estate planning practice.123 Through discussion of a
series of common problems arising in estate planning, Pennell identifies various
areas of the estate planning practice in which interests of people other than the
immediate client take on commanding importance to the lawyer s activities on
behalf of the client.124 Professor Zacharias expands on the concept of multiple
party responsibilities with the notion that lawyers should consider the interests of
third parties and the society at large in the course of representing a client.125

investor. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e, § 77a 77aa (2003). Preparation of the prospectus is a
collaborative process involving the issuer, accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers. See id.
117 SEC v. Nat l Student Mktg. Corp., [1977 1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977) (reporting on the partial settlement in the case).
118 Lorne, supra note 116, at 477 78.
119 Id. at 437 38.
120 Id. at 490.
121 Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 150 52 (1993).
122 Id.

at 152.

123 Pennell, supra note 76, at 716.
124 Id. For a discussion of the lawyer s exposure to malpractice claims by non-clients and

the argument that privity with the client should not preclude such actions, see Hazard, Jr., supra
note 58, at 992. And for the contrary view, see Fogel, supra note 98, at 323.
125 See Zacharias, supra note 95, at 175.
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Zacharias also emphasizes the need for particularized rules that are tailored to the
nature of the lawyer s practice.126

B. Ethics of Care
A second significant trend in the legal ethics discourse involves efforts to
understand and reconcile the tension between rights-based and care-based models
for legal representation. This discussion deepened through the last two decades of
the twentieth century as women entered law schools and law practice in
increasing numbers.127 Carol Gilligan s book spurred the discourse.128 Gilligan
argued that moral and psychological developmental theory derived from studies
of males only.129 Study of females would have offered different perspectives and
led to other theories that emphasized interpersonal relations and caring for others
rather than male-oriented hierarchies and universal principles.130
Legal commentators adapted Gilligan s observations to the study of the
structure of law practice and legal ethics to develop the concept of an
ethic of care.131 Departing from Gilligan s example of the Heinz
126 See id. at 204 09.
127 Women are expected to be the majority of first-year law students this fall [2001],

compared with just 10% in 1970, and almost 50% of the 43,518 students who started law
school last fall. Sarah Stewart Taylor, Women s Numbers in Professional Schools Still Low, at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/628/context/archive (Aug. 23, 2001); see
also Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 314 18 (2000).
128 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
129 See generally id. Gilligan s thesis has been the subject of much criticism as well. For
example, Linda K. Kerber, Some Cautionary Words for Historians, 11 SIGNS 304, 309 (1986),
criticizes Gilligan for oversimplification and for misdirecting focus toward biological
differences between men and women. See also Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Maccoby,
How Different Is the Different Voice ?, 11 SIGNS 310, 315 (1986) (pointing out a lack of
qualitative support for conclusions); cf. Carol Gilligan, Reply, 11 SIGNS 324 (1986) (responding
to Greeno and Maccoby s observations). Gilligan has retreated somewhat from her starkest
observations. See Carol Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN xvii xix (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
130 See GILLIGAN, supra note 128, at 18.
131 See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Difference in Women s Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN S L.J. 81, 81 (1987)
(emphasizing fundamental differences between men and women, with women emphasizing
relationships and care rather than rights); CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 38 39 (1987) (criticizing the derivation of the ethic of care from
women s subservient role); Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We
Claim A Different Voice ?, 15 HARV. WOMEN S L.J. 37, 50 60 (1992) (viewing Gilligan s
book as either conservative or progressive and directs scholars to draw out the book s

1288

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1263

dilemma,132 one commentator suggests that the lawyering process might look
quite different if women rather than men fixed its rules.133 She observes that
women tend to look less to clear answers of right or wrong but seek to find a
solution to problems that would be satisfactory to all.134 Menkel-Meadow
considers the possibility of transformation of lawyering as increasing numbers of
women enter practice but worries that women may not alter the profession, as
they will subscribe to the men s rules under which they received their training.135
Another commentator sees the ethic of care as consistent with advocacy for a
client136 because the lawyer has the connection and context to direct and motivate
the client as the lawyer gains insight into the client s world.137 While no one has
adapted the terminology of an ethic of care to business representation, business
lawyers place great store in gaining insight into their clients businesses and
thought processes in order to design suitable representation.
Ethics discourse trends as disparate as the development of specialized rules
for each practice area and a shift from rights-based rules to an ethics of care have
much in common. Both discussions spotlight multiple interests in representation
as opposed to the readily identifiable client. Commentators have become
concerned with effects of the lawyer s and the client s actions and decisions upon

progressive features); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 531
(Patricia Smith ed., 1993) (considering the negative implications for women of associating an
ethic of care with women).
132 GILLIGAN, supra note 128, at 24 31, observes that an eleven year old boy and an
eleven year old girl respond differently to Heinz s dilemma. Heinz s wife is dying of cancer but
Heinz cannot afford the needed medication. Asked whether Heinz may steal the drug, the boy
made a rights-based analysis and concluded that Heinz would be justified. The girl sought to
find an alternative solution by suggesting negotiation between the druggist and Heinz. The girl
chose caring and interpersonal relationship building to rights analysis.
133 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women s
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN S L.J. 39, 49 (1985).
134 Id. Successful business lawyers often subscribe to a slightly different formulation of
this concept. They believe that the lawyer should never recommend terms that will be
unacceptable to the counter-party to the deal, but should propose terms that accommodate the
interests of the counter-party in order to bring the transaction to completion acceptable to their
own clients. They understand that they must identify what is most important to their own client
and the counter-party and leave those matters static and not subject to negotiation while
everything else is negotiable.
135 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 133, at 50.
136 Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2715
(1993).
137 Id. at 2695.
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non-clients,138 intended beneficiaries of the attorney s efforts on behalf of the
client,139 multiple clients,140 and clients of ambiguous identity.141

VI. POWER DISPARITY, THE LAWYER S ROLE IN ITS EXPLOITATION, AND
DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS
Assorted guises of power disparities play varying roles in relationship to
lawyers intervention. Occasionally, physical power plays a role in the legal
system. Intimidation, for example, deters individuals with legally significant
information from making that information available. Similarly, victims of abuse
fail to testify against or seek legal protections from their abusers. But despite such
examples, physical power disparities affect the American system of justice only to
a very limited degree. In office practice, physical intimidation is likely to be of
only minor significance. Furthermore, existing ethical rules clearly preclude the
lawyer from participating in the client s intimidation of a third party.142
In contrast, economic power disparities assume a far greater role in United
States law. For example, employers historically controlled the terms and
conditions of employment. Many employers offered low wages and poor working
conditions to their employees. Lawyers played a crucial role for employers in
structuring unbalanced employment contracts and in lobbying to prevent the
legislatures from intervening on behalf of workers.143 Recognition of the
significance of that economic power disparity led to unionization, as employees
sought power balance.144 Unionization counter-balanced the employers power
and led to improved wages and working conditions.145 Occasionally, as the
power balance shifted to the unions, union leaders abused the union s
138 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 133, at 50 55.
139 See, e.g., Pennell, supra note 76.
140 See, e.g., Lorne, supra note 116.
141 See, e.g., id.; Sporkin, supra note 121.
142 Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits the lawyer from assisting the client in criminal activity,

and physical intimidation often constitutes the crime of assault. MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
143 See generally ANTHONY WOODIWISS, RIGHTS V. CONSPIRACY: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF LABOUR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1990) (explaining the
sociology of power relationship in management-labor relations).
144 The findings and policies underlying the NRLA are to foster collective bargaining in
order to eliminate part of the imbalance in bargaining power between employers and
employees. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2003).
145 Id. The inequality of bargaining power [that unionization offsets] . . . tends to
aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries. Id.
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consolidated power to gain personal advantages or to destroy businesses.146 Even
when legislation prohibited employers from engaging in specific anti-labor
activities,147 lawyers helped, and possibly motivated, employers to comply with
the letter, but not necessarily the spirit, of the law.148
Economic power is a broad concept. Whenever someone controls a limited
resource, the control bestows economic power. Resource control enables the
holder to impose terms of supply upon others who wish access to the resource.
For example, a small town grocer may enjoy monopolistic power over grocery
prices in the town and charge far higher prices than a supermarket in a big city.149
Informational power disparities also play a vital role in enabling the power
holder to wield economic power. On a simple level, auction-type markets with
time sensitive conditions that preclude the buyer from assembling value
information tend to exploit informational power disparities. One example might
be souvenir shopping in popular tourist destinations, where the buyer has little
time and pricing is a function of bargaining with the vendor.150 Similarly, before
information on dealers costs became public, pricing of automobiles depended
upon the consumer s lack of information, which enabled the automobile dealer to
control the price negotiation.
As consumers become better educated as to pricing mechanisms, either as a
function of individual education or as the market assimilates data, consumers
sometimes learn to be patient and wait for the lowest price at which the seller will
be willing to sell. At the same time, informational power disparity is often a
function of economic power disparity. The person with better or more complete

146 Id.

Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor
organizations . . . have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce . . . . Id. See, for example, discussion of the Genovese family takeover of Local 560
in Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
689, 691 92 (1991).
147 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2003).
148 Consider the plant closing to avoid unionization that violated section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), in Textile Workers Union of America v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965), that might have withstood challenge had
counsel constructed a better argument for business purpose. See generally Note, The Liability of
Labor Relations Consultants for Advising Unfair Labor Practices, 97 HARV. L. REV. 529
(1983).
149 Economists observe that monopolistic power is generally relative to and a function of
barriers to entry. If the price becomes too high, barriers to entry that permitted monopolistic
power in the monopolized market cease to deter competition, or potential consumers of the item
either find a substitute or a less convenient source of supply. Moreover, the small town grocer
may have to charge higher prices if he is unable to capture economies of scale that are available
to the supermarket.
150 Of course, the buyer may not have much interest in the pricing when the souvenir
items are low cost and the buyer is in a free-spending mode on vacation.
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information may have or have had access to education, advisors, and
informational resources commensurate with her economic power.
Power disparities also may be a function of societal, family or other group
structures that allow one person to restrict access to group resources. For example,
religious leaders regularly wield power that is disproportional to their physical
strength or wealth because group members believe them to have informational
superiority. Clergy have the power to deliver or withhold societal approval.151
Similarly, in many cultures, a father s decisions govern the family even if the
decisions are obviously unjust or unreasonable.152
Attorneys regularly play a role in facilitating, encouraging, and even
motivating their clients exploitation of power disparities.153 That role, however
small, presents the issue of the propriety of lending one s skills to the use and
abuse of power. Professor Menkel-Meadow154 recommends teaching the ethic of
care to sensitize lawyers (and clients) to the interests, concerns, and effects their
actions have on third parties, particularly when they abuse power. MenkelMeadow suggests placing the lawyer in the position of the opponent in order to
ask the question: Would I want this done to me? 155
Consider, for example, onerous contractual provisions. The legal culture of
zeal, fortified with law and economics, well may lead the lawyer to seek
enforcement for her client. Without considering the power differential that
permitted the provisions to become part of the contract, the lawyer may see only
the net benefit to her client, rather than her client s priorities.156
Traditional, and possibly superficial, application of law and economics
principles supports enforcement and exploitation of the power advantage.
Lawyers commonly understand law and economics to mandate a simple
balancing of measurable costs and benefits that emanate from existing legal rules
151 And possibly even certain eternal benefits if the belief system in the culture assigns
such control to clergy.
152 See generally LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, BEYOND PATRIARCHY: JEWISH FATHERS AND
FAMILIES 22 23 (2000) (describing family structure and blind adherence to paternal decisions);
see also PATRIARCHY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WOMEN S POSITIONS AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Valentine M. Moghadam ed., 1996) (collecting essays).
153 Ordower, supra note 98, at 315; cf. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, JR., supra note 25, at 5 14
(comparing the role of the lawyer to that of the Godfather).
154 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL Y & L. 75, 109 10 (1994).
155 Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted). Menkel-Meadow certainly intends the question
to include: Would I want this done to my child, spouse, parent, etc.? One may trivialize
Menkel-Meadow s question by noting that the question restates the Golden Rule, and
Menkel-Meadow would wish lawyers to apply the Golden Rule. Recent cultural studies
suggest, however, that the Golden Rule informs behavior unless one has learned not to apply it.
See generally Bower, supra note 26 and discussion infra in text accompanying note 175.
156 Cf. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, JR., supra note 25, at 5 14.
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and their ambiguities. If the economic benefits to one s client outweigh the
economic costs of a specific course of conduct to one s client, the lawyer
recommends that course of action. Non-quantifiable factors are not pertinent to
the analysis.
Because economic analysis measures costs and benefits relative to time,157
immediate benefits are more valuable than the cost of future lost opportunities. In
a situation where a party uses his power advantage to impose a penalty, the
immediate benefit is the amount received from enforcing the penalty. The costs
include transaction costs and the difficult to quantify cost of the counter-party s ill
will. Some of the ill will is immediate and some is possibly continuing, so that
even if one could quantify it, the future ill will would require time value
adjustment. Ill will includes the loss of future good will and possible future
patronage. The more remote in time the cost becomes, the less significant it is to
the economic analysis. Similarly, economic analysis might compare the avoided
cost of eliminating a defect in an existing product with the future, time adjusted
cost of compensating an injured user of the product and the loss of patronage to
the vendor of the product when the injury occurs. Both the compensation and the
loss of patronage are more remote in time. The avoided cost of eliminating the
defect is an immediate benefit.158 Such matters as feelings, self-esteem, and longterm impact on the other party either become quantifiable or lose their place in the
analysis.
Undoubtedly, many attorneys might be initially uncomfortable lending their
skills to impose unfair transactional terms on their clients counter-parties when
the client holds the dominant position relative to the other party. However, the
rules of ethics remind them that their first obligation is to the client,159 and
zealous representation under the ethics rules can motivate them to recommend
exploitation of power advantages. Other attorneys may feel that a fundamental
157 Constant time analysis is fundamental to economic analysis. One cannot compare
amounts received at different times without adjusting them through present or future value
analysis with an assumed interest rate to a single moment in time generally the present time or
a future time at which all events become complete. The following formula represents the
present value of a future receipt:

PV =

FV
(1 + i ) n

Where PV is the present value, FV is the future value, i is the interest rate per compounding
period, and n is the number of compounding periods.
158 Cigarette manufacturers and automobile manufacturers have confronted this analysis
of avoided costs when making decisions with respect to their products. See Derek Yach &
Stella Aguinaga Bialous, Junking Science to Promote Tobacco, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1745,
1745 (2001); Evan P. Schultz, Dollars for Bodies, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at 43.
159 Model Rule 1.2(a) squarely makes the client the primary decision-maker so long as
the activity is neither criminal nor fraudulent. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a)
(2002).
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fairness principle ought to drive their practice but fear that application of that
principle might threaten their livelihood.160 Those attorneys may wonder whether
it is possible to reconcile their duty to their client with more general principles of
honesty and fair dealing when the governing rules of ethics preclude such fairness
considerations. A shift to the multiple client representation model that this Article
recommends would expand ethical boundaries to accommodate the interests of
others whom the lawyer s counsel affects, in order to promote fairness.
Both the Coase Theorem161 that stimulated the law and economics
movement and current behavioral studies162 support those lawyers who would
choose to dissuade their clients from exploiting the clients power advantages.
Although Coase s theories are foundational to law and economics, Coase s
seminal article163 does not aver that economic analysis can and should determine
legal rules. Rather, Coase expresses concern that legislators and courts fail to take
economic displacements into account sufficiently when they alter existing legal
rules.164
In fact, Coase effectively deconstructs any assumed dependence of the legal
rule upon economic efficiency. Instead, Coase argues that the parties can achieve
an economically efficient result so long as the legal rule is stable and predictable
and transaction costs are minimal.165 The legal rule, once settled, gives one party
160 Zacharias, supra note 95, at 190 (noting that doing right may threaten the attorney s
livelihood as a more aggressive attorney may lack such compunction).
161 See generally Coase, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., Bower, supra note 26.
163 See Coase, supra note10.
164 Id. at 44.
165 Id. at 8. Coase observes:

It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage
caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no
market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which
maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing
system is assumed to work without cost.

Id. As to transaction costs, Coase notes that they often are significant and preclude the efficient
market transaction that would make the positioning of the legal rule irrelevant. Id. at 15 16.
Hence, the legal rule does impact economic efficiency when transaction costs come into play.
Coase argues:
It would therefore seem desirable that the courts should understand the economic
consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too
much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences into account
when making their decisions. Even when it is possible to change the legal delimitation of
rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for such
transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out.
Id. at 19.
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certain rights that he may sell to the other party whenever it would be
economically efficient for the other party to buy those rights. At the same time,
Coase proves that economic analysis has nothing to say about which party should
have the legal rights to sell. If the other party had the legal rights, he would sell
them to the first party as long as it was economically efficient for the parties to do
so. Once the legal right becomes fixed, however, the right takes on a value.
Property pricing assumes the stability of that right, and parties buy and sell
their property assuming that fixed legal rights pass with the property. The market
assimilates the existence of the right in determining the value of the property.166
Therefore, in establishing legal rules, Coase deems it critical that economic
factors become part of the basic legal analysis.167 He does not argue that
economic factors are the only ones significant to legal analysis. More important to
Coase, it seems, is the role that economic analysis plays as a factor to consider
carefully when courts and legislatures contemplate altering an existing legal
rule.168 He seems especially concerned that, as one changes rules, economic
displacements occur. There are winners and losers.169
Throughout his analysis, Coase assumes that the parties have equal
bargaining power so that the legal rule alone, rather than a power imbalance,

166 Similarly, the efficient capital market hypothesis assumes that the marketplace rapidly
assimilates public information and economic conditions and builds them into the price of
securities. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS 384 87 (2d ed. 1998). Fair markets require that all participants in the market have
equal access to material information so that the marketplace can assimilate the information and
price the securities accordingly. Thus, in order to provide fair markets in securities, Congress
mandated disclosure of material information as the foundation of the securities laws for the
efficient functioning of the markets. See LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 1G (2d ed.
1961).
167 Coase, supra note 10, at 44.
168 Id.
169 Coase writes:

But in choosing between social arrangements within the context of which individual
decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which
will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. . . .
In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total
effect.

Id

Pursuing distributional fairness, social justice, and avoidance of harm to others might
be just as important to legal analysis as weighing economic costs and benefits, although
those latter factors might be more difficult to address than readily quantifiable costs and
benefits.

2003]

MODERATING POWER DISPARITY

1295

determines which party will make a payment to the other.170 Coase s law and
economics would not favor exploitation of power disparities, as such inequality is
a structural flaw that is economically inefficient.171
Fairness, of course, is not an absolute concept. It tends to be situational.
Lawyers often think of fairness strictly in procedural terms. So long as each party
has access to a disinterested forum for resolution of disputes and is not prevented
from securing competent legal representation, resource disparity is not unfair.
This Article acknowledges a working, procedural definition of fairness but prefers
a concept of fairness that demands a balance in outcome that equal bargaining
power and resources would generate.172
In seeking a distributionally fair result, indicia of unfairness are not always
transparent. Lack of negotiation may suggest that one party has the power to
dictate the transaction s terms to the other party s detriment. But absence of
meaningful negotiation in economic transactions may only reflect the
transaction s simplicity and the parties agreement as to value and terms. When
there is little to negotiate because terms are fair, inequalities in bargaining power
are trivial. Equality in bargaining power would produce no different result. Such
cases may be easy for the attorney and she may prepare documentation to
complete a fair transaction even if the attorney s client dictates the terms. This
Article does not concern itself with such transactions, of which there are many,
except to suggest that, so long as the transactional counter-parties do not enjoy
equal bargaining power, a risk that one party will take advantage of the other is
ever present.
Reports on recent behavioral studies using economic, market exchange
experiments in a variety of cultures suggest that distributional fairness rather
than exploitation of power advantages is the dominant norm among cultures.173
The studies disclose a pattern of fair dealing and sharing both within groups and
among members of different groups, especially where a market economy is
familiar to the participants.174 Researchers conducting the studies attribute fair
dealing in part to conflict avoidance.175 This cutting-edge research contradicts
170 Id. at 5. In this situation, Coase chooses a legal rule to apply to the cattle-raiser and the

farmer and allows them to negotiate freely. Coase does not address power to act with impunity
contrary to the legal rule. Id.
171 Id. at 44.
172 The Delaware Supreme Court adopted a concept of entire fairness that embraced
both fair dealing and a fair price for corporate mergers in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 710 11 (Del. 1983), thereby rejecting the notion that fair procedures alone suffice to
preclude claims by disgruntled minority shareholders.
173 See generally Bower, supra note 26.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 105 06 (discussing studies). The Golden Rule may have an ascertainable
basis in human behavior. In the legal literature, there is a growing movement in law and
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earlier assumptions that human beings seize whatever advantages they can.
Bower writes:
Many evolutionary biologists hold that natural selection has favored individuals
who are genetically inclined to act out of self-interest in order to propagate their
own genes.
Henrich [Joseph Henrich, anthropologist at the Institute for Advanced Study
in Berlin] theorizes that, throughout humanity s evolution, groups that devised
the most successful social guidelines for pursuing fair interactions left competing
groups in the dust. This process advanced genetic traits in the surviving groups
that proved conducive to hashing out equitable deals.176

Accordingly, the lawyer who recommends courses of action to her clients
that produce distributional fairness may be serving the client better than those
who encourage and legitimate exploitation of power advantages. The extended
multiple client representation model of this Article would enable the lawyer to
analyze the needs and interests of constituencies other than the immediate client
and to recommend a distributionally fair course of conduct to the immediate
client.177

behavioral science that looks closely at the behavioral studies in building law and economics
models. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000)
(introducing modified law and economics methodology to include behavioral sciences). The
authors do not conclude that departure from standard rational choice models is irrational.
Rather, they suggest that rational choice theories of law and economics are flawed and fail to
offer a complete behavioral picture. Id. at 1143 44. Coase may well have understood this
behavior, but perhaps his law and economics successors did not. See supra text accompanying
and following note 161.
176 Bower, supra note 26, at 106. Similarly, in a classic paper reporting on game theory
experiments, the description of the decisional process in the experimental games includes
observations that, despite stated game goals of selfishness and competitiveness, the players
were cooperative. G.K. Kalisch et al., Some Experimental n-Person Games, in NASH, JR., supra
note 27, at 61, 68. Further, the authors (with disappointment) report that in three person
cooperative games, [t]he results of this experiment were rather negative. The players were
simply unwilling to play competitively. Id. at 86.
177 Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002). As a proponent of
behavioral law and economics, Greenfield makes similar arguments in favor of corporate
constituency statutes. Fairness requires that corporate directors take employees and possibly
others into account in corporate decision making. Behavioral ultimatum games demonstrate that
within groups, individuals choose fair distribution of wealth over individual wealth
maximization. Id. at 632 34.
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VII. DEFINING INTERVENTIONAL FUNCTIONS
Intervention is a matter of the extent to which the client directs the lawyer. As
the client permits the lawyer increasing autonomy, the lawyer intervenes more to
define the legal course of action. At least three discrete interventional levels
characterize American legal practice. The lawyer may move between
interventional functions in the course of representation on a single matter. The
following paragraphs describe the levels in ascending degree of the lawyer s
transactional intervention.

A. Scrivener-Lawyers
A lawyer may act in a ministerial manner without becoming engaged in the
client s decision making. The lawyer drafts required documents according to the
client s instructions.178 In this instance, the lawyer is a scrivener.179 A scrivener
who believes that the goals the client wishes her to assist in pursuing are wrong is
in a difficult position. The client has sought no advice, but may be unaware of
potential exposure to liability and may welcome the lawyer s analysis and
recommendations. Further, the client simply may have concluded that because
others use similar structures,180 the client would be at a disadvantage in avoiding
them. Also, the client may not have considered possible adverse impacts of the
structures on third parties or how objectionable legal structure might affect the

178 Needless to say, existing ethical rules generally do not limit the lawyer s responsibility

for actions taken while acting as a scrivener. For example, the lawyer may not assist the client
in commission of a crime or fraud. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002). As
scrivener, the lawyer must remain mindful of the conflict of interest rules. MODEL RULES OF
PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). On the other hand, if the scrivener truly acts as an intermediary
between or among clients because she renders no legal advice, the Model Rules offer no
specific guidance. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (2002).
179 Frequently, attorneys offer to assume that role when multiple parties with potentially
disparate interests have the unity of purpose to be co-participants in a common transaction. In
large law firms, the lawyer, acting as the scrivener, prepares the necessary documentation. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text. She seeks to isolate herself from other lawyers in the
firm who continue to represent one of the parties to the transaction on other matters. The
effectiveness of this Chinese Wall between members of the firm is questionable. The wall
requires the scrivener to favor neither the interests of the firm s historical client nor the interests
of the non-client parties. In order to do so, the attorney must ignore what she knows from prior
representation about the interests of the existing client in structuring and drafting documentation
for the transaction.
180 See infra Part VII.C. (discussing use of form contracts).
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client s reputation negatively. Sometimes the lawyer s only option may be refusal
of representation if the client s goals are not acceptable to her.181

B. Architect-Lawyers
Often a client brings to the lawyer the client s transactional and economic
objectives and leaves design and implementation of the transaction to the lawyer.
This Article calls this function the architect-lawyer. Here the attorney has the
opportunity to show the breadth of her creativity. The attorney may have an array
of techniques and structures: some will impact third parties adversely, others may
not. If the lawyer withholds recommending a creative, permissible structure that
affects third parties adversely, the lawyer fails to provide the client with the full
range of available structures and possibly falls short in diligence.182 Yet if the
lawyer offers a legal tool that the lawyer knows to be harmful to third parties, the
lawyer may appear more responsible for that harm than a scrivener who
implements but makes no recommendation.

C. Entrepreneur-Lawyers
Lawyers assume entrepreneurial roles in the interest of generating business.
Plaintiff s personal injury lawyers regularly advertise with the goal of informing
potential clients of their possible claims that they may not have pursued. Business
and tax lawyers seek out planning opportunities that enable their clients to gain
some economic or legal advantage about which the client otherwise might be
ignorant. Sometimes, the lawyer as entrepreneur recommends to the client a
transaction that the lawyer or a third party has introduced, or the client may have a
nascent transaction concept and the lawyer develops the idea. Lawyers also
design concepts and market them through others to the client,183 rather than the
client defining goals. In this case the lawyer may have immediate responsibility
for collateral effects of the plan equal to or greater than the client to whom the
lawyer sold the plan.

181 A lawyer may terminate or decline representation so long as the termination or refusal

of representation does not materially affect the client adversely. MODEL RULES OF PROF L
CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002). Preparing documents or structuring the transaction in a manner
contrary to the client s instructions without informing the client is not an option, as such actions
would directly violate the attorney s contractual agreement with the client.
182 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (requiring lawyers to
be diligent in representation).
183 Investment banking firms have marketed many corporate tax shelters. Tax
professionals, including tax lawyers, design the shelter techniques and script the
implementation for investment bankers to sell. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Dynegy's Tax
Shelter, 95 TAX NOTES 305, 307 08 (2002).
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The motivational vector from the attorney s recommendation to the client s
acceptance of the plan is identifiable and direct. In the case of scriveners, the
motivational vector seems to be the reverse running from the client to the
lawyer. For architect lawyers, direction of the motivation is less obvious the
attorney designs the plan to suit the client s objectives. Nevertheless, the
examples in the next part of this Article demonstrate that the motivational
direction with all three types of legal invention often is the same the attorney
motivates the client.

VIII. INTERVENTIONAL ROLES AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES:
SOME EXAMPLES
In Part III, this Article described the common business practice of single
lawyer representation of multiple parties to a transaction. The lawyer knows that
she must balance the interests of the parties in order to complete the assignment
successfully. In other instances, multiple party representation is inherent in the
nature of the engagement. For example, lawyers who represent organizations
routinely engage in multiple party representation.184 The organization acts
through its duly authorized constituents185 who may not have
identical interests.186 Constituents include officers, directors, employees,
shareholders and other constituents.187 Other constituents might mean the
communities at large in which the organization s headquarters or operations
are located,188 in the case of a publicly traded organization,189 the
184 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2002).
185 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2002).
186 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d), (e) (2002) (requiring the lawyer to
explain the identity of the client when the organization s interests are adverse to the
constituent s interests and permitting the lawyer to represent the organization and one or more
constituents).
187 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 1 5 (2002) ( The Entity as the
Client ).
188 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citing
Martin Lipton & Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors Responsibilities:
An Update, ABA NAT L INST. ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORP. CONTROL, Dec. 8, 1983, reprinted
in 40 BUS. LAW. 1403 (1985)). Unocal makes other constituencies, including creditors,
employees, vendors, etc., part of the mix of affected parties that corporate directors may
consider in evaluating whether or not to defend against a takeover attempt. If the board of
directors may consider the other constituencies, the lawyer for the organization would have to
consider those constituencies as well. But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (limiting consideration of other constituencies once an
auction for control of the corporation commences).
189 Some thirty states have enacted specific constituency statutes that permit or require
corporate boards to consider the interests of various third parties in corporate decision making.
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investing public190 and, in the case of a charitable organization, the underlying
charitable beneficiaries.191 Similarly, whether or not one considers privity to bar
the beneficiary from making claims against the estate planning lawyer,192 estate
planning by definition involves interests of more than one party: the property
owner who is deciding how to transmit wealth and the ultimate recipients of that
wealth.193 Further, lawyers prepare many form contracts, especially consumer
contracts, knowing that the counter-party to the direct client whom the contract
also will bind has neither separate representation nor the bargaining power to
influence the provisions of the contract, even if he had separate representation.194
The direct client, or in the case of an entity client, management of the entity,
in each of the above examples uses the lawyer s skills in a manner that affects the
other constituencies. The other constituencies often have insufficient bargaining
power to alter that effect.195 The attorney should apply a multiple party
In evaluating a prospective takeover, Oregon s statute, for example, permits corporate directors
to give due consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on employees,
customers . . . and on the communities . . . in which the corporation operate[s] . . . including the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the
corporation . . . . OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1999). New York s statute is similar, 6 N.Y.
BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (2001). See generally Greenfield, supra note 177 (discussing constituency
statutes in the context of behavioral law and economics and arguing that broadening corporate
directors fiduciary duties to include employees and others might increase economic efficiency
overall even though shareholders wealth might decline); see also Jonathan D. Springer,
Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85
(1999) (comparing various constituency statutes).
190 See Lorne, supra note 118; Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of
Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994).
191 Creighton Univ. v. Kleinfeld, 919 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing Creighton
to bring an action against drafting attorney for making it, as residuary beneficiary, solely
responsible for taxes on QTIP trust); see also Jewish Hosp. v. Boatmen's Nat l Bank of
Belleville, 633 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that because the beneficiaries of
charitable trusts, unlike beneficiaries of private trusts, are ordinarily indefinite, the state s
attorney general has primary responsibility for the supervision of charitable trusts and is
generally the proper party to enforce them); see, e.g., Hardman v. Feinstein, 240 Cal. Rptr. 483
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Standing for beneficiaries was found nonetheless in Jones v. Grant, 344
So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (students of university sue trustees for breach of fiduciary duties
in administering trust), but the Alabama Nonprofit Corporation Act, ALA. CODE §§ 10-3A-1 to
3A-225, superceded that right in 1984.
192 Compare Fogel, supra note 98 (no obligation to beneficiaries), with Hazard, supra
note 58 (obligation to beneficiaries).
193 Ordower, supra note 98, at 332 33.
194 Vukowich, supra note 44, at 800, 811.
195 Trade unions and organized consumer groups may be able to consolidate power to
combat overreaching, but in many cases the employer or the vendor under a one-sided contract
may act before the group can assemble information concerning the transaction structure that
overreaches. Cf. supra note 145 and accompanying text; see generally MICHAEL D. YATES,
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representation model whenever she anticipates that the nature of the
representation will affect persons other than her direct client and those others
who, for whatever reason, cannot negotiate to moderate her direct client s
decisions.196 The next section offers an example of each interventional level and
explores whether the responsibility that accompanies a multiple party
representation model should be universal or should vary as a function of the
lawyer s role.

A. Cash Balance Conversions and the Lawyer as Entrepreneur
The lawyer approaches the client and informs the client (or prospective
client) that the client has need for specific legal services of which the client may
have been unaware. The lawyer recommends a legal structure or transaction
without the client first engaging the lawyer to advise on the matter. While the
lawyer s mode of reaching prospective clients differs from that of the muchmaligned ambulance chaser, 197 it involves marketing one s services as personal
injury practice often does. The lawyer meets clients through referrals or pursues
previous representation contacts (including cross-selling of services to clients of a
firm) and seeks to persuade the clients that the lawyer can provide a legal product
that has economic value for the client. 198
One such product is the cash balance pension plan.199 Employers that convert
their existing defined benefit retirement plans200 into cash balance plans are able
WHY UNIONS MATTER (1998); FELIX G. RIVERA & JOHN L. ERLICH, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (2d ed. 1995).
196 See supra Part IV (discussing proposed standard).
197 [A]mbulance chaser. 1. A lawyer who approaches victims of accidents in hopes of
persuading them to sue for damages. BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (7th ed. 1999).
198 One lawyer I interviewed who actively engages in a pension plan practice cautions that
lawyers do little of the marketing of pension plans and modifications of existing plans.
Consultants develop the products and prepare slick presentations for the clients. Lawyers cannot
hold a candle to pension consultants when it comes to marketing plan changes and new
structures to plan users. His view was that the lawyers serve more the scrivener role than the
entrepreneur role. The consultants sell the product to the clients and the clients have the lawyers
prepare the documents and do the compliance work.
199 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000),
explains the conversion, the reasons for converting, and the benefits to the employer. The
controversy involves only conversions and not independent establishment of cash balance
plans. A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan under which the employee s pension benefit
is a function of the balance in his or her account at the time of retirement and, thus, resembles a
defined contribution plan. The cash balance builds at a substantially constant rate throughout
the term of employment.
200 Pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
( ERISA ), codified in part in 26 U.S.C. §§ 401 09 (2001) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 1461
(2001), are either defined benefit or defined contribution plans. Employers or employees, or
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to utilize the excess plan value,201 without incurring tax-based penalties, 202 to
fund benefits that would be attractive to young, possibly mobile203 employees.
Conversions tend to limit older employees continuing benefit accruals.204 The

both employers and employees, contribute to defined contribution plans that establish accounts
for the employees. The contributions and earnings on the account of an employee provide the
fund from which the employee draws upon retirement. Accordingly, the contribution is defined
but the benefit is unknown until retirement. In the case of a defined benefit plan, the employer
establishes a plan to provide a specific benefit to retiring employees based upon their
compensation, age, and length of service. Actuarial computations enable the employer to
determine how much to contribute to the plan each year to fund the benefit for all current
employees. The plan defines the benefit but not the contribution, since the contribution is a
function of the composition of the work force (including age, length of service, etc.), rates of
return on invested capital in the plan, and life expectancy of employees.
201 Rapid investment appreciation during the 1990s produced the excess. The
accumulations are excess because under the plan s actuarial assumptions, the plan will not need
the accumulations to fund employees retirement benefits. Actuarial assumptions evaluate
factors including age and length of service of employees in determining how much the plan
must have in order to fund the retirement benefits. Under a traditional plan, benefit accrual rates
increase steeply as employees age and approach retirement. So, adding younger employees to
the work force does not materially increase the amount of plan assets the plan requires and does
not consume the excess assets that successful investment generates. Zelinsky, supra note 196, at
709 13.
202 I.R.C. § 4980 (2001). The employer cannot use the excess accumulation to provide
portable benefits to younger employees under a defined contribution plan because the tax rules
do not permit free movement of assets from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. Use
of the funds from the defined benefit plan would be a reversion subject to the reversion
penalties under I.R.C. § 4980. Since the cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan, conversion
of the traditional plan into a cash balance plan occurs without penalty. Conversion permits the
employer to fund the increased and possibly portable benefits for the younger employees with
the accumulated excess in the traditional plan. The employer does not have to contribute to
another plan for those employees. In most conversion instances, the conversion benefit provides
a windfall to the employer who did not anticipate the windfall as part of his business plan. The
potential windfall provides the entrepreneurial lawyer with a valuable marketing tool.
203 Unlike traditional defined benefit plans, cash balance plan accounts are often portable.
Portability means that the employee has a vested account in the plan. When the employee
leaves before retirement, the employee keeps the account balance rather than losing benefits
under a traditional plan. Accordingly, pension benefits cease to depend on a lifelong
commitment to a single employer.
204 While conversion does not reduce older employees accrued benefits, it does diminish
the rate of future accrual. In addition, a wear-away feature typically limits additions to older
employees cash balance plan accounts. If the older employee s accrued benefit at the time of
conversion exceeds the amount that the employee would have accrued under the cash balance
plan, as is likely to be the case, the plan would fund the older employee s future benefit by
wearing away that excess rather than by increasing the employee s separate account balance.
See Zelinsky, supra note 199, at 743 48.
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adverse impact of the conversions on older employees has attracted media
attention,205litigation,206 and controversy.207
While some commentators view the benefit formula of new rather than
converted cash balance plans as being neutral with respect to age,208 conversion
of traditional plans into cash benefit plans shifts future accrual benefits from older
to younger employees.209 Accordingly, conversion discriminates against the most
expensive employees under traditional defined benefit plans.210 As conversion
impacts older employees adversely, it benefits employers. Conversion provides
205 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Clinton Seeks Disclosure Rules on Changes to

Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at C11. In light of the Enron Corporation s recent
bankruptcy filing, the media are likely to focus attention on so-called 401k plans, named after
the enabling provision I.R.C. § 401(k) (2001), that invest in the employer s securities.
206 Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2000), holds that the plan must
use interest rates under I.R.C. § 417(e)(3)(A) (2001) to determine lump sum distributions of
accrued benefits under cash balance plans. Similarly, I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359
mandates use of government supplied interest rates for computing lump sum plan distributions.
Recently, in Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,596
(S.D. Ill. 2003), on cross-motions for summary judgment in a class action suit, the court
held the IBM benefit accrual formula under its cash balance plan to be age discriminatory
in violation of ERISA. And in Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d
755 (7th Cir. 2003), also a class action, employees who participated in the cash balance
plan and took a lump sum distribution on termination of employment successfully
challenged the manner in which the plan computed the benefit. The court held the
formula to violate non-discrimination rules in ERISA.
207 The government proposed to limit the impact of the conversions through increased
disclosure obligations in order to eliminate informational power disparities between the
employer and the employee. See, e.g., Pension Reduction Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 1708,
106th Cong. (1999) (proposing to amend ERISA § 204(h) to mandate increased data
disclosure).
208 The neutrality observation is itself controversial. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 196, at
734.
209 Controversy surrounding cash balance conversions led the Internal Revenue Service to
require that plan sponsors request technical advice before conversion, Rev. Proc. 2001-5, 20011 C.B. 164, 170, in order to enforce a Clinton administration moratorium on conversions. I.R.S.
Announcement 2003-1, 2003-2 I.R.B. 1, announced that responses to technical advice would
follow final regulations on age discrimination. The Department of the Treasury promulgated
proposed regulations that permit, without age discrimination limitations, the reduction of
accruals based upon years in service, as opposed to age, even though age and years in service
correlate. See I.R.C. § 411(b), Reductions of Accruals and Allocations because of Attainment of
Any Age, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,123 (Dec. 11, 2002); see also, Lee A. Sheppard, A Square Peg in a
Round Hole: Cash Balance Plans Ratified, 97 TAX NOTES 1386 (2002) (providing a brief
critique of the proposed regulations).
210 Sheppard, supra note 206. This may not be discrimination in participation and benefits
that ERISA prohibits. But see Richard C. Shea, et al., Age Discrimination in Cash Balance
Plans: Another View, 19 VA. TAX REV. 763 (2000); Kevin P. O Brien & Rosina B. Barker,
Letter re Cash Balance Wear-Away, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 249-13 (2001).
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employers the opportunity to offer portability in a cash balance plan which
facilitates the employer s ability to attract young, enthusiastic, mobile employees
who might not view a specific job as life-long. Retirement benefits that those
employees do not lose when they change employment are an appealing feature of
a compensation package. Further conversion enables the employer to capture for
itself some of the historical investment success of its existing defined benefit plan
and use it to fund those portable benefits.211
Thus, the conversion product would benefit the entrepreneurial lawyer s
direct client, the employer, and would harm others. Those others, the older
employees, could do little to prevent the harm from conversion even if they had
separate representation because selection of plans and conversion is wholly within
the employer s control (without participation of the employees the conversion
affects). Informational power disparity may accompany the direct power disparity
of the employer-employee relationship. Moreover, direct power disparity between
the employer and the employee tends to increase as the employee ages and
becomes less mobile and marketable.212
For the lawyer, traditional definitions of the client identify only the employer
as the client. The single client representation model and the culture of zeal lead to
the conclusion that the lawyer should develop and recommend the conversion
structure to the employer. The structure benefits the employer, who the lawyer
represents (or hopes to represent) zealously. The single client model does not
mandate that the lawyer explore options that might provide a smaller benefit to
the employer but be less harmful to others.
As primary motivator, the lawyer must bear a large share of the responsibility
for the plan s adverse effects on employees. Sensitivity to the older employees
might lead to the establishment of a parallel or integrated cash balance plan. All
employees could elect plans. Older employees would be likely to elect the
traditional plan while younger employees would prefer the cash balance plan.213
By giving older employees this option, the employer achieves the goal of
portability for younger employees but loses some or all of the opportunity to
capture for itself the benefit of a historically successful investment performance of
211 See Zelinsky, supra note 198, at 709 13.
212 Employment options for older individuals diminish because older employees have

become expensive and often specialized. With their relatively short-term employment futures,
older employees are less desirable to prospective employers than younger individuals.
Employers often are unwilling to invest in retraining for new jobs. See e.g.,
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, 2001 PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA, at
http://www.ncoa.org/content.cfm?sectionID=168&detail=74#workers (last visited Nov. 12,
2003). However, the New York Times reports improvements in the job market for older
individuals as older workers make up a larger percentage of the work force
(approximately 12%) than they did in 2000. Louis Uchitelle, Older Workers Are Thriving
Despite Recent Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at A1.
213 Zelinsky, supra note 198, at 697.
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the plan s assets.214 The trade-off for reducing the windfall to the employer would
be fairer treatment of the older employees.215

B. Estate Planning and the Architect Lawyer
Most clients come to their estate planners with a basic idea of how they desire
to distribute their wealth when they die. The clients expect the lawyers to design
estate plans to carry out those wishes in a tax-efficient manner. The degree of
intervention by the lawyer is less than it is in the case of the lawyer-entrepreneur
because the client comes to the lawyer, not the lawyer to the client. But the degree
of intervention in the case of estate planning does not necessarily make the lawyer
less responsible for the impact of the representation on other constituencies.
Estate planning clients are particularly vulnerable to the influence from their
estate planning lawyers.216
The lawyers remain keenly aware of their competition both from other
lawyers and from non-lawyer participants in estate planning and tend to respond
to the competition by offering each client the full range of standardized planning
products. Frequently, lawyers do not understand the underlying family dynamics.
Instead, lawyers offer plans that employ a variety of clever techniques qualified
terminable interest property trusts (Qtips)217 and dynastic trusts,218 for example
214 It is unclear whether or not partial conversion is possible to permit the employer to use

part of the excess from the traditional plan to fund the cash balance plan. If it is, the amount of
available excess would be less than that available under complete conversion because the costs
of funding the older employees with the continuing traditional plan would be higher.
215 But see John M. Vine & Richard C. Shea, Re: The Anti-Backloading Rules, 2001 TAX
NOTES TODAY 110, 110 23 (2001) (featuring a letter to William Sweetnam, Esq. that expresses
the concern that the IRS application of anti-backloading rules would preclude such protection of
older employees). Legislative or regulatory intervention might be necessary to facilitate the
bifurcated plan but the plan would not be contrary to the public policy that ERISA advances.
216 See, e.g., Ordower, supra note 98, at 314 15.
217 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1992) permits passage of property to a surviving spouse in a
manner that qualifies the testamentary gift for the unlimited, estate tax marital deduction but
denies the survivor control over investment of the property, access to the corpus, and power to
designate the recipients following the survivor s death. For arguments against the propriety of
the qualified terminable interest property trust because it disempowers and degrades women,
see Ordower, supra note 98 at 343 44; Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction Qtip
Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN S L.J. 301 (1995).
218 Historically, the rule against perpetuities prevented the transfer of property in trust if
the trust would continue for a period longer than lives in being plus twenty-one years. Recently
several states, North Dakota and New Jersey among them, have enacted legislation that
eliminates the rule against perpetuities and permits establishment of trusts that will continue for
many generations. While the trusts enjoy tax-favored status because their assets become subject
to the estate or gift tax and the generation-skipping tax only once, they often delegate to a
trustee who is not the beneficiary considerable control over the wealth and its disposition.
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to pass wealth while seeming to keep control of the wealth for the donor.
However, the donor does not retain control because the donor will be dead when
the trusts become operative. Instead, control goes to the deputy for the
client/donor and the intended recipients of the client s estate are somewhat
disempowered.
In many instances, some or all of the beneficiaries of the trusts are also clients
of the same lawyer. Estate planners routinely prepare estate plans for the family
unit consisting of husband, wife, and sometimes children.219 The owner of the
bulk of the family s wealth may be one spouse, perhaps the husband. The estate
planning lawyer discusses the estate plan with the husband, as the lawyer prepares
wills and trusts for husband and wife. The lawyer mentions or recommends to the
husband the Qtip trust and describes it as a common and popular estate planning
mechanism. It helps to preserve the family wealth for the children in the event the
wife remarries. It also allows the client to designate someone other than the wife
as trustee, so the wife need not concern herself with management of the family
wealth.
The Qtip disempowers the wife with respect to ultimate control over the
family s wealth.220 The husband may have had no intention of disempowering his
wife. And even if it did occur to the husband, it may be a wrong-headed and
offensive notion.221 Nevertheless, because this is standard practice and the
attorney s recommendation legitimizes the Qtip device, rendering it appropriate
and helpful, the husband follows the attorney s advice. A sense of balance may
lead the lawyer to recommend that the wife create a similar trust for her husband.
Since she controls little of the family unit s wealth, parallel financial
disempowerment and balance is illusory.
The estate plan for the marital unit seems contrary to the best interests of the
wife, and possibly the family as a whole, as it denies the wife decision making
power with respect to the children as they mature. Under existing rules, if the
lawyer recognizes that the plan she has devised may be objectionable to the wife,
she must not represent the wife unless the wife gives her informed consent to
the representation. In order for consent to be informed, however, the lawyer
would have to provide full disclosure of the objectionable elements of the
proposed plan and explain why they are objectionable.222 Since the wife is
unrepresented, the lawyer may recommend only that the wife secure separate

219 Cf. Pennell, supra note 76 (describing trend towards estate planning for family units as
opposed to individuals).
220 The Qtip is just an example. As much as the estate planning industry depends upon
various trust configurations, many trusts disempower their beneficiaries without compelling
reasons for so doing. See Ordower, supra note 98 at 328.
221 See, e.g., Gerzog, supra note 217.
222 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002).
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counsel.223 Unfortunately, separate counsel for the wife will not cure the defect.
Except for the power of persuasion that separate counsel might bring to bear,
separate counsel is substantially powerless. The wife s lawyer has power only
derivatively through the wife. Since the wife controls the smaller portion of
family wealth, she has little economic bargaining power. Even though state law
offers the wife a forced share of the husband s estate, that share is woefully
inadequate. While state legislatures designed the forced share to substitute for the
wife s dower rights under common law and to prevent husbands from
disinheriting their wives, both dower and forced share statutes are extremely
limited in scope.224 Most often, electing the forced share would leave the wife in
a financially less secure position than would result from accepting the Qtip and its
control limitations.225 Further, even the separate counsel s power of persuasion is
exercisable only through the wife. Ethical rules generally bar separate counsel
from contacting the husband directly.226 Divorce might approach equalization of
the spouses wealth but is hardly a tactic one might recommend in an otherwise
successful marriage.
The estate planning lawyer might avoid the conflict if she enters the
representational relationship with a clear understanding of all affected parties. The
husband would understand that the lawyer represents multiple parties, including
the wife, children, and possible collateral relatives and charities as well. The
lawyer, then, would be sensitive to the interests and needs of all parties and would
be able to maintain limited confidences and to negotiate an overall plan that
accommodates the principal objectives of all. Planning in this manner demands a
223 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4.3 & cmts. 1 2 (2002).
224 The limited scope is similar to the unconscionability concept in the Uniform

Commercial Code, which prevents only the most egregious overreaching in consumer
contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); discussion infra Part VIII.C (discussing related issues
with form consumer contracts).
225 By electing the forced share, the wife relinquishes other interests in the husband s
estate. Generally, the forced share is one-third of the husband s estate, excluding proceeds of
life insurance that are not payable to the husband s estate. Economically, the present value of
the income interest in the bulk of the husband s estate often is significantly greater than the
amount of the forced share. For example, Missouri gives the surviving spouse the power to take
one-half the deceased spouse s estate if there are no lineal descendants and one-third if there are
lineal descendants. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (1957). The decedent s estate is enhanced by
lifetime transfers and life insurance payable to the surviving spouse but not by transfers or
insurance payable to third parties, and the elective share decreases by the value of lifetime
transfers and life insurance payable to the surviving spouse. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.163
(1981). Under the 1969 UPC, the spouse was entitled to a one-third share. Under the current
version, however, the share percentage depends on the length of the marriage (from
supplemental amount only for a newlywed couple, up to 50% for a fifteen-plus year
marriage) and the valuation is based on the "augmented estate" which includes nonprobate
transfers to others. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1990).
226 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002).
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high level of engagement and a willingness to reject the easy to use, estateplanning molds. The lawyer might have to refrain from recommending some
techniques that like the Qtip tend to disempower individuals in favor of a
more inclusive approach to estate planning. Undoubtedly, there will be situations
in which such multiple party representation would be impossible. Ethical rules
should not bar multiple party representation generally, as it frequently is the most
efficient manner in which to address family needs and is likely to prove less
costly and breed less ill will. The family becomes representative of the situation in
the multiple party representation model that Part II of this Article describes.

C. Form Consumer Contracts and the Scrivener Lawyer
Most businesses that provide goods or services for future delivery rely on
form contracts to define their relationship with their customers.227 Business
owners and managers understand that many, possibly most, of their customers
will sign the form contract without reading, much less comprehending, the terms
of the contracts.228 The longer and more detailed the contract is, the less likely
customers are to read the contract, especially if the transaction is routine229 or
time is critical.230 While educated consumers are more likely to read the contract
than uneducated consumers, both are likely to forego the reading because both
realize that the contractual terms are non-negotiable.231 The customer either signs
the form contract or the transaction will not take place. Whether or not onerous
provisions of the contract are enforceable is of little consequence.
A colleague described her recent encounter with an unenforceable contract.
The operator of a facility that provides children s birthday parties requires each
parent to sign a waiver of liability form upon arrival before the child may enter
the facility. The form exculpates the facility and its employees from any
responsibility for injury to any child attending a birthday party. The circumstances
are coercive. A parent who does not wish to sign the waiver must leave with the
child after the child has seen all her classmates or friends entering the facility.
227 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts About Freedom of

Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 32 (1943); Vukowich, supra note 44, at 802.
228 See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code The Emperor s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967).
229 The purchase of ordinary consumer goods, for example.
230 Renting a car is an example where the customer is often short of time, and an impatient
line of other customers is waiting for service. The person presenting the contract for signature
generally has no power to vary the contractual terms on behalf of the vendor. The clerk at a
rental car counter has the power only to permit the customer to accept or waive additional
insurance coverages but has no authority with respect to the printed contract terms.
231 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 49 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
(viewing absence of choice and unreasonable contract terms as unconscionability); see
alsoVukowich supra note 44, at 800.
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Imagine the parent s dilemma! There can be little reason for the waiver other than
to give the facility operator leverage to use against those parents of injured
children who are not aware that the provision is unenforceable.232
Sometimes legislation regulates the contract by providing the consumer with
a cancellation option for a limited period.233 Legislation or judicial decisions may
limit enforceability of onerous contractual provisions as well. Forfeiture
penalties234 and confession of judgment clauses235 often are unenforceable.
Nevertheless, the contracts tend to remain one-sided and frequently include
provisions that are not enforceable or are of doubtful enforceability.236
Lawyers prepare the forms. Some of those lawyers are architect lawyers237
who design the contract for a specific type of client. The architects anticipate all
imaginable eventualities and resolve them in favor of the client.238 Often,
however, attorneys prepare one-sided form contracts in response to clients
specific instructions. Clients in those instances are not seeking legal advice but
following what they perceive or what the lawyers think their clients perceive to be
the industry norm. Frequently, the client will have seen a competitor s contract or
a contract used in a related industry and will instruct the lawyer to prepare a
similar form for the client s consumer transactions. Whether as architects or
scriveners, the lawyers know that some provisions in the contract are not

232 See, e.g., Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. App. Dep t Super.
Ct. 1993) (holding that a contractual disclaimer in a written agreement did not insulate
defendant lessor of ski boots from strict products liability in tort). However, courts have held
that exculpatory agreements, within the context of recreational activities, are not adhesion
contracts. See, e.g., Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber:
Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
Then again, contracts parents sign for minors are subject to disaffirmation and additional
validation scrutiny. See, e.g., Del Bosco v. United States Ski Ass n, 839 F. Supp. 1470 (D.
Colo. 1993) (finding that nothing in the agreement indicated that by signing the agreement the
skier s mother agreed to waive the skier s claims). Even experienced lawyers, however, may
doubt whether the waiver is unenforceable and are dissuaded from bringing an action for a
compensable, but non-permanent, injury to their child.
233 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1995) (providing a rescission right with respect to
consumer credit transactions); Rule Concerning a Cooling-Off Period, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2001)
(outlining the FTC s door-to-door sales rule).
234 See Vukowich, supra note 44, at 822.
235 See id.
236 Proposed Model Rule 4.3 would have prohibited the lawyer from drafting an
agreement that is illegal, contains legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be
held to be unconscionable as a matter of law. Vukowich, supra note 45 at 833.
237 Cf. supra Part VII.B.
238 Karl Llewellyn observed that lawyers draft to the edge of the possible. N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM N, supra note 8.
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enforceable,239 others are of doubtful enforceability,240 and still others are
enforceable but exploitive of the client s superior bargaining position relative to
the customer. One commentator argues that legislative change and decisional law
have tended to correct the imbalance in the standard form contract system, but
that the process of correction has been inefficient and slow.241
Federal law, for example, renders disclaimers of the warranty of
merchantability unenforceable.242 Similarly, the warranty of habitability in a
residential lease is not subject to waiver whether by express contract or
otherwise.243 Nevertheless, broad disclaimers of warranty still accompany the
sale of many consumer goods and severe habitability warranty limitations persist
in some rental contracts. With respect to unenforceable provisions, their inclusion
in the contract is solely strategic. Their presence in the contract benefits the client
not through application but because they will deter some customers from acting
contrary to the express, but unenforceable, contractual language. What reason
could there be for including the language other than to take advantage of the other
party s informational deficit? Informed parties would know the provision to be
unenforceable and would proceed as if the unenforceable provision did not exist.
The uninformed, on the other hand, may forego an opportunity or a remedy
otherwise available because of the unenforceable language. Lawyers who draft
the language aid their clients in exploiting their informational power
superiority.244
While the proposed rule the ABA rejected governing illegal contract
language245 would not have barred many imbalanced provisions of form
239 See Ass n. of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. On Prof l Ethics, Op. 722
(1948) (determining that it is unethical to include an unlawful tenant waiver of a sixty-day
period in which to cancel a rent increase).
240 See Vukowich, supra note 44, at 823.
241 Id. at 824 (proposing greater policing of the forms by the legal profession that creates
them).
242 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 2312 (2001).
243 See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130 31 (W. Va. 1978) ( [S]ince [i]t is fair to
presume that no individual would voluntarily choose to live in a dwelling that had become
unsafe for human habitation, we hold that waivers of the implied warranty of habitability are
against public policy. (footnote omitted)); Boston Hous. Auth. v Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831,
836 (Mass. 1985).
244 The waiver may not be utterly without function other than to deceive. The express
contractual waiver, under the Parol Evidence Rule, may serve the function of precluding the
other party from introducing oral warranties because the contract addresses warranties in
writing. Parol-evidence rule. The principle that a writing intended by the parties to be a final
embodiment of their agreement cannot be modified by evidence that adds to, varies, or
contradicts the writing. BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY 1139 (7th ed. 1999).
245 MODEL RULES OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY R. 4.3 (Proposed Official Draft 2002). See
Vukowich, supra note 44.
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contracts, the rule at least would have compelled practitioners to reflect upon the
language they drafted and the impact that language has on the contracting parties.
Without the rule, the Model Rules do not prohibit inclusions of unenforceable
provisions,246 but neither do the Rules promote those inclusions as part of the
lawyer s obligations to the client. If the client specifically requests the inclusion,
the lawyer presumably should include the provisions because the client defines
the scope and goals of the representation so long as the lawyer does not assist the
client in perpetrating a fraud or a criminal act.247 The Rules silence as to
unenforceable provisions is neutral on the issue and each lawyer must decide
whether including unenforceable provisions serves a permissible objective for the
client.248
Language of doubtful enforceability and other one-sided provisions appear in
the contract because the other party lacks the bargaining power to resist their
inclusion. Under current rules emerging from the culture of zeal, the lawyer s
obligation well may be to include such provisions to assist the client in
maximizing his economic position. At the same time, the attorney preparing the
language confirms for or signals to the client that the language is customary,
appropriate, and part of an industry norm representative of the industry s
participants. Thus, unbalanced contracts can become the norm in the industry as
soon as one lawyer prepares one for one client. Without evaluating the impact of
the contractual language on the customers, each industry participant implicitly
may have relied upon counsel to provide a contract that was suitable to the type of
transaction in which the client customarily engaged. Many industry participants
themselves may not comprehend the function of the offensive contractual
language. Frequently, when one questions specific language, the industry
participant responds that the language is just what the lawyers provided and that
he, the industry participant, does not ever seek to enforce the provision.249
In fact the normalization of one-sided contracting may saddle an industry
with a reputation for dishonesty and unfair dealing. Customers may approach the
industry with distrust.250 While occasionally clients may benefit from one-sided
contractual terms, clients also may lose business to other industries that provide a
marginally substitutable product when the competing industry enjoys a consumer
246 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002).
247 See id.
248 If the lawyer finds the purpose of language unacceptable, the lawyer may withdraw
from representation. MODEL RULE OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002).
249 Evidence of this practice is anecdotal but it does seem commonplace. Cf. N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM N, supra note 8, at 113 (reporting Karl Llewellyn s observation that clients
frequently do not want drafting to the edge of the possible at all); see also Vukowich, supra
note 44, at 803 n.20.
250 Vukowich, supra note 44, at 810 11 (observing that consumers discount the
significance of terms because they assume that they are the industry norm).
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reputation for honesty and fair dealing. Even scrivener lawyers should help their
clients evaluate whether what the clients perceive to be the industry norm is
useful or desirable for the client. A lawyer who, adopting a multiple party
representation model, sees the unrepresented consumer as a constituency upon
which the lawyer s activities have a significant impact, will evaluate the overall
impact of the type of contract the client will use more carefully than the single
client lawyer.251 A scrivener should explain to the immediate client, whether or
not asked, the ramifications of the contract, limitations on enforceability, and
possible effect of the contract s language on the client s reputation. The benefit of
the imbalanced language measured against the effect on the client s reputation
and harm to other affected constituencies may suffice to dissuade the client from
following the industry norm and, by abandoning the norm, the client may effect a
shift in the norm to balanced contracting.

IX. CONCLUSION: THE MULTIPLE PARTY REPRESENTATION MODEL
Both the Model Code and Model Rules provide helpful bright line rules of
conduct for client representation in genuine adversarial contexts, that is,
preparation for or conduct of litigation. Drafters of the Model Rules, however,
expressed considerable discomfort with the culture of zeal generally. As noted
earlier,252 commentary accompanying the Model Rules, but not the Rules
themselves, suggests that zealous advocacy is inappropriate when the opposing
party is poorly represented, not represented, or lacks sufficient power to alter the
outcome even if well-represented. The Model Rules do not integrate the
limitation on zealous advocacy into any rule and thus fail to develop the standard
of legal conduct for instances in which zealous advocacy may be inappropriate.
Bright line rules facilitate compliance. But bright line rules of conduct
emanating from the single client, zealous advocacy model of legal practice have
led to a level of ruthlessness in law practice that has sullied the reputation of the
legal profession.253 In many instances, the legal profession has propelled its

251 Compare this with the proposal to shift responsibility to lawyers for the standard form
contract system. See id. at 826 41.
252 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002); see also supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
253 See the rather bleak picture of the legal profession that emerges from JOSEPH, supra
note 16. Lawyers ratings in recent public confidence surveys confirm the public view of
lawyers. See Symposium, American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the U.S. Justice
System, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1320 (1999) ( [O]nly 14% of respondents said they are
extremely or very confident in lawyers. In fact, the only category generating less confidence
than the U.S. Congress and lawyers is the media at 8%. . . . Further, almost half of all
respondents (42%) lack confidence in lawyers. ). For a summary of the extensive 1993 Hart
Survey on public opinions of lawyers, see Daicoff, supra note 15, at 552. See also Marc
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clients to focus only on immediate benefit to themselves in their legal dealings.
But single client advocacy models ignore the realities of ordinary legal practice.
Lawyers do not operate in a vacuum in which only lawyer and client are
important. Ethical rules that require or encourage the lawyer to pretend that the
vacuum exists disserve the legal community.
In litigation contexts, increasing reliance on negotiation and mediation rather
than litigation suggests broad-based discomfort with the culture of zeal as the preeminent basis for all legal representation and settlement of disputes. Rather than
motivating clients to exploit power disparities, lawyers can encourage their clients
to moderate or even abandon that tendency. Ethical rules that acknowledge the
impact of legal representation on people other than the direct client better serve
the legal community. In making the transition away from exploitation of power
advantages, such ethical rules would enable lawyers to take other constituencies
into account rather than prohibit them from doing so.254
The task of developing rules to accommodate the interests of people with
little bargaining power in a specific context is formidable. The certainty that
bright line rules offer may have to yield to an inexact standard of conduct like the
one this Article proposes.255 That standard assigns to the lawyer the burden of
representing all interests that the representation will affect. This new rule of
conduct is based upon a multiple party representation model in which the lawyer
has a primary client but will look after other clients and constituencies with an
underlying do no harm standard. Under the multiple client model, lawyering
becomes inclusive rather than isolating as it is now.
The proposed standard of conduct requires the lawyer to do what many
lawyers always have done.256 They treat each representational setting as if they
have several clients who wish to work together but have moderately diverging
interests. Because the current rules limit multiple party representation, lawyers
may not acknowledge that the clients interests diverge or that the lawyer is
engaging in the balancing of interests. Even if, as Hazard describes it, the lawyer
is playing god, the practice may be unobjectionable nevertheless.257 It
accomplishes the clients common objective as effectively, and often more
effectively, than separate, adversarial representation would and tends to moderate
the cost of the legal services for the transaction.258
Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political
Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 808 10 (1998).
254 By focusing on the primacy of the client, Model Rule 1.2, for example, prohibits
lawyers from considering third party interests in any meaningful way.
255 See supra Part IV.
256 See Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 761 62.
257 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 64 65 (1978).
258 See Dzienkowski, supra note 35 at 747; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts
of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 414 (1998). But see Bassett, supra note 21, at 436 37 (arguing
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The multiple client representation model would give substance to the vague
hints in the Model Rules commentary concerning doing justice and moderating
zeal when the adversary is inadequately or not represented.259 Such a rule frees
lawyers to do what they do well without the need to worry that their conduct
violates ethical limitations and potentially will attract disciplinary sanctions. The
proposed rule permits lawyers to add thoughtful balance to their analytical
guidance and keen problem-solving skills. Initially, the rule may have to remain
aspirational and permissive, rather than mandatory, lest it become a source for
malpractice claims.260 In a limited number of practice areas, however, including
estate planning and securities practice where impacts on persons other than the
direct client are immediately within the design of the client representation, the
proposed rule should become the mandatory norm.
Without doubt, each reader can identify specific situations in which the
standard this Article proposes is impractical. Certainly the lawyer who represents
a sports star negotiating for an increased salary from the team cannot respond
adequately to the impact the salary will have on ticket prices and the general
public. Higher ticket prices well may exclude some fans that will be unable or
unwilling to pay the higher price.261 On the other hand, willingness to consider
that the negotiated salary might result in exclusion of some fans, higher
concession prices, or smaller community donations by the team s owner, extends
cost-benefit analysis into the realm of items that are exceedingly difficult to
quantify. Included in that realm are other matters that the proposed standard
identifies as legitimate aspects of lawyers evaluative processes such as historical
and continuing interpersonal relations, self-esteem of affected people, and the
reputation of the client in the community. Thus, identifying fact patterns in which
the Article s standard might be too broad or might fail completely is not a
challenge. By permitting lawyers the flexibility to consider matters other than
direct economic costs and benefits, the proposed standard empowers lawyers to
serve their clients more effectively than current rules permit. The real challenge is
to identify the array of instances in which lawyers would welcome the proposed
standard that would allow them to represent their clients with a view toward their
own and their clients position in a broader societal or familial context.

that attorney disqualification results in cost and effort duplication and eliminates potential cost
savings).
259 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002).
260 As noted earlier, ethical rules generally do not provide a source for malpractice
liability, but most jurisdictions view them as evidence of the standard of conduct. Supra note 52
and accompanying text. A significant change in the rules may lead some to use the change as an
argument for imposing malpractice liability.
261 A colleague proposed this hypothetical instance to highlight the flaw of the broadbased reach of the proposed standard.

